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Executive Summary 
 
The protracted economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe led directly to a major increase in mixed 
migration flows to South Africa. Migrants were drawn from every sector of society, all education and 
skill levels, equal numbers of both sexes, and all ages (including unaccompanied child migration). 
Many migrants claimed asylum in South Africa which gave them the right to work while they waited for 
a refugee hearing. Many others were arrested and deported back to Zimbabwe. Migrants who were 
unable to find employment in the formal economy turned to employment and self-employment in the 
informal economy. These migrant entrepreneurs used personal savings to establish small and micro 
enterprises in many urban areas. The businesses focused on retail trading, manufacturing and 
services and contributed to the South African economy in various ways, including providing 
employment for South Africans.   
 
Nationwide xenophobic violence in 2008 targeted all migrants, irrespective of origin and legal status. 
From 2008 onwards, violent attacks on migrant-owned informal businesses began to escalate. This 
culminated in a second round of nationwide xenophobic violence in early 2015 when migrant-owned 
businesses were targeted by mobs. Migrants send essential remittances to family in Zimbabwe and 
return migration is not a viable or long-term response until Zimbabwe’s economic crisis is resolved. As 
a result, informal migrant entrepreneurs have adapted to hostile business conditions by adopting a 
range of strategies to avoid and protect themselves and their businesses from xenophobia. 
 
Against this backdrop, this report first discusses the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe and its 
connections with large-scale out-migration, particularly to South Africa. The South African response to 
crisis-driven migration is reviewed showing how the government shifted from a predominantly coercive 
and control-oriented policy towards a more realistic assessment of the need to accommodate migrants 
through an immigration amnesty and the right to work in the formal and informal sector. One of the 
major challenges facing migrants and all stakeholders in South Africa is xenophobic violence. 
Nationwide attacks on migrants and refugees in 2008 and 2015 have been interspersed with ongoing 
lower-level episodes of violence. These attacks have increasingly targeted migrants and refugees, 
including many Zimbabweans, seeking to make a living in the country’s urban informal economy.   
 
The research for this report focused on the business activities and responses to xenophobic violence 
of Zimbabweans in the informal economy. Amongst the key findings were the following: 
 
 Between 20-30% of Zimbabwean migrants in South African cities are involved in the informal 
economy and the importance of informal sector employment to Zimbabweans has increased 
over time. 
 Zimbabweans operating enterprises in the informal economy are predominantly young (50-
75% under the age of 35) and male (60-70%) 
 Nearly two-thirds of the migrant entrepreneurs arrived in South Africa in the peak years of the 
Zimbabwean crisis between 2000 and 2010 (42%). Another 32% migrated after 2010. Less 
than 2% migrated to South Africa before the end of apartheid. 
 Economic hardship, unemployment and political persecution are the main push drivers of 
migration to South Africa. Pull drivers include the assistance of relatives already in South 
Africa and the prospect of employment. 
 The majority of the Zimbabwean migrant enterprises are in the retail, trade and wholesale 
sector, followed by services and manufacturing. Around three-quarters of the migrants relied 
on their personal savings to start their businesses and many worked in the formal economy 
first. 
 Business expansion has occurred despite the prime obligation of the entrepreneurs to 
support family still in Zimbabwe. Instead of reinvesting all of the business profits into further 
expansion, a portion is therefore diverted into remittance channels. Over one-third remit 
funds at least once per month and only 12% never send remittances. 
 A significant number of the entrepreneurs had been victims of or knew other who had been 
victims of crime such as looting and robbery, xenophobic abuse and police misconduct 
abuse. 
 x 
 
The report then presents the results of in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean business-owners who had 
experienced xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 or at other times. The narratives of the migrants 
provide insights into the unpredictable nature of the violence, their vulnerability to attack, the loss of 
business goods and property during mob violence and the need to restart from scratch, and the 
various strategies that they adopt to reduce risk.  These strategies include operating in safer areas (not 
feasible for all), avoiding areas where corrupt police tend to operate, paying for protection and flight 
when xenophobic violence erupts.  Return to Zimbabwe is not considered a viable option because of 
the economic conditions there. 
 
The interviews also provide insights into the migrants’ perceptions of government and stakeholder 
responses to the xenophobic violence.  Almost without exception, the migrants felt that neither 
government (the Zimbabwean or South African) had done anything to protect or assist them during and 
after the violence. This perception of inaction also extended to international and non-governmental 
organisations. The migrants were particularly harsh in their comments about the police who were 
widely seen as either conniving in the violence or uninterested in protecting migrants. 
 
The perceptions of the migrants that nothing is done may simply be a function of who was interviewed 
and does not necessarily reflect the actual reality. The report therefore evaluates the response of the 
South African government to the ongoing crisis of xenophobia and concludes that some actions – such 
as sending in the army – are taken during episodes of nationwide violence but that ongoing daily and 
weekly attacks are generally ignored. There is a strong official line that these attacks are not motivated 
by xenophobia and. Indeed, that xenophobia does not even exist. This is clearly contradicted by the 
migrants who view the attacks as motivated by xenophobia. A second element of the official response 
is that the migrants are partially to blame for what happens to them as their business success builds 
resentment amongst South Africans. Government has yet to acknowledge that migrant-owned informal 
enterprises make a valuable contribution to the economy of the country, including through job creation 
for South Africans. The primary response to the violence of 2015 was the launching of a military-style 
Operation Fiela which was justified as a crime-fighting initiative but appears to have targeted migrant 
enterprises.   
 
The final sections of the report examine the responses and programmes of various non-governmental 
and international organisations to the crisis of xenophobia. During large-scale xenophobic violence 
there is considerable mobilisation of anti-xenophobia civil society organisations to offer protection and 
protest. Their effectiveness and impact tends to dissipate when the violence is more scattered and 
random. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has played a major role in the past in 
holding government to account and articulating extensive recommendations for remedial action, most 
of which have not been taken up and many of which are still highly relevant. International organisations 
have tended to target integration and education programming at the community level but there has 
only been one systematic evaluation (of the UNHCR’s response) which was highly critical of the 
organisation. These organisations and other governments are considerably hamstrung by xenophobia 
denialism at the highest level because it means that government will avoid the kinds of partnership that 
are urgently needed to address this endemic crisis.         
 
 
1 
 
 “It is a problem, but I would never define it as a crisis”  
(Charles Nqakula, South Africa’s Safety and Security Minister, 2008) 
 
“They are very xenophobic – they are the owners of xenophobia”  
(Zimbabwean Migrant, Cape Town, 2016) 
 
“Our country will one day be stable and we will go back. Tomorrow it might be them in a crisis and 
when they come to us, people will hold on to that grudge. So if they treat us well, we will also”  
(Zimbabwean Migrant, Johannesburg, 2016) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 2015, the European Union (EU) launched ‘Migrants in Countries in Crisis: Supporting an 
Evidence-based Approach for Effective and Cooperative State Action’, a four-year project 
implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). This EU-
funded project is a contribution to the global Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) initiative, a 
government-led process co-chaired by the governments of the Philippines and the United States, 
which shares similar goals. The project aims to improve the capacity of states and other 
stakeholders to assist and provide protection to migrants who find themselves in countries 
affected by crisis, as well as address the long-term implications of such situations. Within the 
project, six regional consultations with states and other relevant stakeholders have been 
conducted, contributing to the development of the MICIC initiative ‘Guidelines to protect migrants 
in countries experiencing conflict or natural disaster’
1
, which provide guidance for states and 
other stakeholders in responding to the needs of migrants caught in crisis situations. In addition, 
the project also develops capacity building activities to follow up on key recommendations that 
have emerged over the course of the project.
2
 This case study report presents the results of one 
case study among six
3
 of the Research Component of the EU-funded MICIC project, whose goal 
is to complement these efforts by providing policy-relevant analysis of the implications of crises in 
host countries.  
 
Humanitarian emergencies involving human migration are generally perceived to be of a singular, 
unidimensional character, affecting one of two categories of migrant: either those forced to leave 
their home countries by crisis conditions or those living in another country affected by a crisis. 
Most attention has been given to the first category and the precarious circumstances of those 
displaced to other countries by political, economic and social conditions in their countries of 
origin.
4
 Indeed, the global humanitarian regime is based on principles of protection and 
assistance for those forcibly displaced by political events, violent conflict and individual 
persecution.
5
 The second category are migrants who have been trapped by unexpectedly volatile 
and dangerous situations in countries of destination, including natural disasters, civil conflict or 
anti-migrant intolerance. The term “migration in countries in crisis” is usually taken to refer to the 
plight of these migrants caught up in an unexpected crisis situation in a “host country”.
6
  
                                                 
1
 Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative. (2016). Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries 
Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster. Retrieved from: 
https://micicinitiative.iom.int/sites/default/files/document/MICIC_Guidelines_english_web_13_09_2016.pdf. 
2
 For more information on the capacity building activities, as well as the regional consultations, see: 
http://www.icmpd.org/our-work/migrants-in-countries-in-crisis/.  
3
 The other case studies under study are: Central African Republic political unrest of 2013-2014; Côte 
d’Ivoire political unrest of 2002-2003 and 2010-2011; Libya political unrest of 2011; Lebanon situation of 
migrant domestic workers and the 2006 crisis; and Thailand natural disaster of 2011. 
4
 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., Loescher, G., Long, K., & Sigona, N. (Eds.). (2014). The Oxford handbook of 
refugee and forced migration studies. OUP Oxford. 
5
 Martin, S. F., Weerasinghe, S., & Taylor, A. (2014). Humanitarian crises and migration: Causes, 
consequences and responses. Routledge.  
6
 Koser, K. (2014). “Non-Citizens Caught Up in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster” In S. Martin, S. 
Weerasinghe and A. Taylor (eds.), Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences and 
Responses (London: Routledge), pp. 267- 286. 
 2 
 
Although emergencies affecting migrants are becoming increasingly complex and multifaceted, 
the intersection of crisis situations in countries of origin and destination have been given 
insufficient attention
7
, although referenced in the recently produced MICIC guidelines. A dual or 
multiple crisis situation spanning origin and destination presents new, and not easily resolved, 
challenges for the management of crisis and the safety of displaced migrants.
8
 The distinction 
between refugees and other types of migrant is certainly blurred in such complex circumstances.
9
 
Moreover, the intersection of crises affects the kinds of assistance that can be given to migrants 
by both sending and receiving governments as well as by humanitarian agencies and other actors. 
Significant protection gaps also exist for those trapped by a double crisis.
10
 For example, 
migrants in a country in crisis may not have the option of return migration if crisis conditions in 
their country of origin make return unviable. The newly forged vulnerabilities that such complex 
circumstances generate have not yet been adequately documented or understood.
11
 As Martin et 
al.
12
 argue, effective, humane and implementable principles and practices are required to respond 
to these types of complex crisis-related movement.  
 
Lindley has examined the relationship between “crisis” and “migration” and shows that both 
processes are largely viewed as exceptional, aberrant phenomena.
13
 While “crisis” circumstances 
are seen to occur outside the realm of regular, “normal” development and change, migration is 
seen as a threat to the regular order of relationships between state and its citizens. As she notes, 
“there is a deep well of sedentarist thinking (which) frames migration as crisis and staying put as 
the natural and desirable human condition”.
14
 In such circumstances, large-scale flows to another 
jurisdiction precipitated by crisis conditions are inevitably viewed in a negative light and as placing 
a significant strain on host populations. Far from appreciating the crisis-driven nature of these 
movements, host populations very often respond with a mixture of anxiety, animosity and 
intolerance to the physical presence of migrants who have been forced to flee intolerable 
circumstances in their home countries. The result can be the generation of a different set of crisis 
conditions for migrants to confront in their country of destination.   
 
In this context, migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa tends to be seen as an atypical, 
exceptional, and temporary phenomenon, characterised almost entirely in negative or abnormal 
terms. Migration is seen solely as a speedy response to crisis in Zimbabwe, overlooking the many 
reasons people leave and the fact that more people stay put than migrate. Longer histories of 
migration and previous ties connecting these countries in the past are all forgotten. Also ignored 
are the ways in which older patterns of migrations have influenced later ones. On the South 
African side, migrants from Zimbabwe are viewed as an unwanted burden, usurping what are 
regularly characterised as ‘limited’ or ‘scarce’ resources meant exclusively for citizens. 
Exaggerated numbers feed the alarmist view of uncontrolled waves of migrants ‘flooding’ and 
‘swamping’ South Africa. The many benefits South Africa and its citizens receive from migrants 
                                                 
7
 IOM (2012). Moving to Safety: Migration Consequences of Complex Crises. Background Paper, 
International Organization for Migration, Geneva; McAdam, J. (2014). Conceptualizing ‘Crisis Migration’: A 
Theoretical Perspective. In S. Martin, S. Weerasinghe and A. Taylor (eds.), Humanitarian Crises and 
Migration: Causes, Consequences and Responses (London: Routledge), pp. 28-50. 
8
 Hendow, M., Pailey, R. and Bravi, A. (2016). Migrants in Countries in Crisis: Emerging Findings, A 
Comparative Study of Six Crisis Situations. International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna; 
Perching, B. (2016). Actor and Stakeholder Involvement in Crisis Mitigation. MICIC Research Brief, 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna.  
9
 Betts, A. (2013). Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press). 
10
 Betts, A. (2014). The Global Governance of Crisis Migration. In S. Martin, S. Weerasinghe and A. Taylor 
(eds.), Humanitarian Crises and Migration: Causes, Consequences and Responses (London: Routledge), pp. 
349-367. 
11
 Pailey, R. (2016). Long-term Socio-Economic Implications of ‘Crisis-Induced’ Migration on Countries of 
Origin. MICIC Research Brief, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna. 
12
 Martin, S. F., Weerasinghe, S., & Taylor, A. (2014).  
13
 Lindley, A. (2014). Exploring Crisis and Migration: Concepts and Issues. In A. Lindley (ed.), Crisis and 
Migration: Critical Perspectives (London: Routledge), pp. 1-23. 
14
 Lindley, A. (2014). 
 3 
through skills acquisition and job creation are forgotten. However, the ‘plight’ of Zimbabweans in 
South Africa represents a very different scenario since most are only there in the first place 
because of an enduring crisis at home. This is therefore a case study of a double bind where 
migrants are caught up in crises (albeit of different kinds) in both countries simultaneously.  
 
Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa have therefore been forced to navigate not a singular 
emergency at a particular location, but two protracted crises occurring concurrently. While these 
two crises have unfolded in neighbouring states, their decisive moments or turning points have 
similar timeframes, suggesting a direct association between them. It is the simultaneity and 
intersectionality of these two crises, the actual and perceived relationships between them, their 
multi-sited nature, and the transnational governance of migration by two separate states that 
need to be taken into account. By intersectionality, we refer to the manner in which these two 
crises are linked and the combined effects they produce for the management of xenophobic 
violence in the country of destination, South Africa. Given the specific set of crisis circumstances, 
and their protracted nature, a linear, straightforward sequence of humanitarian assistance and 
effective management from pre-crisis and post-emergency stages is unsettled.  
 
One crisis involves the political turmoil and economic meltdown in Zimbabwe after 2000, which 
has driven hundreds of thousands of citizens to seek a less precarious existence for themselves 
and their families by migrating to other countries.
15
 As a politically stable and economically robust 
neighbouring state, with low transaction costs for migration, South Africa has become an 
attractive destination for many crisis-driven migrants. Yet far from providing a safe space for 
refuge and rebuilding, South Africans have responded with increasing prejudice to the presence 
of Zimbabwean migrants.  
 
The other protracted and simultaneous crisis is therefore the xenophobic intolerance and violence 
in South Africa in which Zimbabwean migrants have become enmeshed. Xenophobia is not 
simply a response to migration from Zimbabwe, however, but part of a more general post-
apartheid response to the opening up of South Africa to migrants from the rest of Africa and 
further afield.
16
 The targets of xenophobia and xenophobic violence are all foreign migrants and 
refugees, although the particular circumstances of migration from Zimbabwe have done little to 
insulate or protect Zimbabwean migrants. Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa who fled political 
violence and/or the desperate economic circumstances in their country of origin, have faced the 
daunting challenge of securing employment and re-building their lives in South Africa, while 
continuing to face routine challenges of discrimination, social exclusion, xenophobic harassment 
and violence.
17
   
 
Whether opposition to immigration, negative attitudes towards and stereotyping of migrants, and 
restrictive policies constitute a ‘crisis’ is certainly debatable, for much of the world would then fall 
into this category. In a world of sovereign states, most would defend the right of the South African 
government to decide what kind of migration policy it wishes to follow and understand why South 
Africans might resent migrants whom they feel, however mistakenly, are depriving them of their 
entitlements as citizens. At the same time, South Africa is often singled out as a uniquely 
xenophobic society, or as the migrant quoted in the epigraph observed, South Africans are “the 
owners of xenophobia.”  Researchers have attached various labels to South African xenophobia 
                                                 
15
 Crush, J. & Tevera, D. (eds.). Zimbabwe’s Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival (Ottawa: IDRC). 
16
 Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2014). Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Denialism, Minimalism, 
Realism. SAMP Migration Policy Series No 66, Cape Town and Waterloo. 
17
 Hungwe, C. and Gelderblom, D. (2014). Understanding the Social Exclusion of Zimbabwean Migrants in 
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including “the politics of fear”, “a new pathology”, “the dark side of democracy”, “apartheid vertigo”, 
“the demons within” and “new racism”.
18
  
 
Rather than seeing South Africa as exceptional or as an aberration, however, it would be more 
fruitful to view it as one point on a spectrum of intolerance and as offering salutary lessons for 
other jurisdictions – both on the drivers of xenophobia and how to respond to its malevolent 
effects. The main reason is that xenophobia is on the rise in both the global North and South and 
if its general and specific causes are not understood, recognised and addressed, then it has the 
potential to escalate into the kind of violence regularly witnessed in South Africa.
19
 
 
The crisis of xenophobia in South Africa is defined by discrimination and intolerance to which 
migrants are exposed on a daily basis, which assumes an acute, volatile and violent form at 
particular moments. Recurrent episodes of xenophobic violence represent ‘tipping points’ or 
intense moments in the general ongoing crisis of xenophobia. In this report, we therefore propose 
a distinction between routine and extreme forms of xenophobia. Routine xenophobia manifests 
itself in negative stereotyping, exclusionary language, verbal denigration, denial of access to 
services such as health and education, and insistent demands from citizens that government rid 
their communities and the country of ‘foreigners’.    
 
But the nub of the crisis of xenophobia in South Africa is when feelings of hostility and intolerance 
manifest as extreme xenophobia which Crush and Ramachandran define as “a heightened form 
of xenophobia in which hostility and opposition to those perceived as outsiders and foreigners is 
strongly embedded and expressed through aggressive acts directed at migrants and refugees 
(and) recurrent episodes of violence.
20
 Recent national surveys of South African citizens by the 
Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) found that a significant minority were willing to 
resort to violence against migrants. As many as a quarter said it was likely or very likely that they 
would take action to prevent migrants moving into or opening a business in their home area, and 
one in ten that they were likely to use violence against migrants in their community.
21
    
 
The deadliest examples of extreme xenophobia in South Africa to date were high-profile and 
widespread violence against migrants and refugees in May 2008 and March 2015. The nature 
and impacts of the 2008 crisis are now well-documented, although there remain differences of 
opinion about its causes.
22
 For all its strengths, the literature on May 2008 tends to treat the 
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victims of xenophobic violence in rather undifferentiated fashion, leading to the assumption that 
all migrants – irrespective of national origin, legal status, length of time in the country and 
livelihood activity – were equally at risk. Yet, attitudinal surveys clearly show that South Africans 
differentiate between migrants of different national origin and that Zimbabweans are amongst the 
most disliked by South Africans.
23
 Discussions of May 2008 also do not differentiate sufficiently 
between the types of targets that were attacked. For example, many African migrants and 
refugees operated small businesses in the informal economy of affected urban areas and these 
enterprises came under sustained attack during the wave of violence. In 2015, one of the explicit 
targets of the xenophobic attacks were informal businesses run by migrants and refugees.    
 
As this report demonstrates, violent attacks on migrant and refugee entrepreneurs and their 
businesses have certainly not been confined to acute episodes of extreme xenophobia such as in 
May 2008 and March 2015.
24
 Ongoing acts of extreme xenophobia have increasingly manifested 
in the form of collective violence targeted at migrant- and refugee-owned businesses. We refer to 
this phenomenon as chronic extreme xenophobia and a situation of continuous low-level crisis. 
The frequency and ferocity of such attacks have increased over time. The chronic form of 
extreme xenophobia has prompted various responses and remedial actions by migrants and 
refugees including paying protection money to the police, local authorities and taxi associations; 
beefing up personal and business security; arming in self-defence; avoiding neighbourhoods and 
public spaces known to be particularly dangerous; and moving away from the major cities in 
search of safer and less contested business environments in smaller urban centres.
25
  
 
The focus of this report is an important sub-group of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa: that is, 
those who earn their livelihoods through informal entrepreneurship in urban spaces. The primary 
rationale for choosing this sub-group is that both acute and chronic forms of extreme xenophobia 
have increasingly manifested in the form of violence against this group of migrants.  
Zimbabweans are not the only small business-owners who have become victims of acute and 
chronic extreme xenophobia in South Africa: attacks on migrants and refugees from other 
countries are also well documented.
26
 However, there have been no studies to date specifically 
examining the case of migrant entrepreneurs from Zimbabwe trying to make a living in the South 
African informal economy.  
 
This report is therefore a contribution to our understanding of the crisis of xenophobia in South 
Africa focused on a group of migrants who are an integral part of two other groups: Zimbabwean 
migrants as a whole and migrant and refugee entrepreneurs in general. It is also a contribution to 
the general literature on migrants in countries in crisis in a situation of intersectionality where 
migrants are in a double bind, forced to navigate a state of crisis in both the country of origin and 
the country of destination.  
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2. Research Methodology  
 
The research for this report focused on a number of key, inter-related questions with a particular 
focus on the relationship between the double crisis and informal entrepreneurship by 
Zimbabwean migrants in the informal economy of South African cities: 
 
 The nature of Zimbabwean participation in the South African informal economy including 
entrepreneurial motivations (survivalist or opportunity-driven), types of activities, business 
strategies and challenges, and contributions to the South African economy; 
 The experiences of xenophobic attitudes, behaviours and violence of Zimbabwean 
migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa and the impact of xenophobia on their businesses 
and livelihoods;  
 The business strategies adopted by Zimbabwean entrepreneurs to minimise their 
vulnerability to xenophobic violence and their responses when actually caught up in 
collective attacks. 
 The response of the two governments to xenophobic violence targeting the informal 
economy and what strategies, if any, they have put in place to mitigate the situation of 
migrants whose businesses have been plundered or destroyed. 
 The response of other stakeholders, including NGOs, CSOs, international organisations 
and migrant associations to xenophobic violence affecting migrants in the informal 
economy and the effectiveness of these responses. 
 
In addition to a comprehensive review of the existing secondary and grey literature relevant to 
this topic, the research undertaken for this report included the following:  
 
 Documentary research including review of all commissions of enquiry, independent 
reports, official press statements, and media reporting on xenophobic violence covering 
the period 2008 to 2016; 
 SAMP surveys of migrant enterprises in the informal economy conducted in Cape Town 
and Johannesburg in 2015. This survey captured a random sample of over 1,000 
migrant-owned businesses, of which 304 were run by migrants from Zimbabwe. For the 
purposes of this report, we extracted a database of the subset of Zimbabweans which 
amounted to 186 in Johannesburg and 118 in Cape Town. The informal enterprises had 
to meet three basic criteria for inclusion in the study: (a) owned by a Zimbabwean; (b) in 
operation for at least two years; and (c) unregistered with the South African Revenue 
Services (SARS). 
 In-depth interviews were conducted with 46 Zimbabwean informal entrepreneurs in mid-
2016 who were operating businesses in Johannesburg (18), Cape Town (19) and 
Polokwane (9) (Annex A); 
 A total of 30 key informant interviews were undertaken in Cape Town, Johannesburg, 
Polowane and Harare with representatives of NGOs, human rights organisations, 
Zimbabwean migrant associations, international organisations, the South African 
Department of Home Affairs and the City of Johannesburg (Annex B). Repeated requests 
were made for interviews with the Zimbabwe Consulate in South Africa and the 
Zimbabwean Department of Home Affairs. At time of writing, these requests had not been 
successful.  
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3. The Crisis in Zimbabwe   
 
3.1. Political Persecution, Economic Collapse 
 
There is now a large literature on the causes, characteristics and impacts of the economic and 
political crisis and near-collapse of Zimbabwe into failed state status.
27
 Some date the economic 
crisis from the imposition of the failed Structural Adjustment Programme in the 1990s, and out-
migration from the country did start to increase during that decade.
28
 But the general descent into 
economic and political chaos escalated rapidly after 2000 and is generally reckoned to have 
reached its nadir in 2008. Until 2014, the Failed States Index consistently identified Zimbabwe as 
one of the top ten countries in the world at high risk for widespread catastrophe, ranking not far 
below states that have experienced protracted violent conflict and civil war like Somalia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan.  
 
The depth of the crisis in Zimbabwe is indicated by the fact that by 2008, inflation had reached 
231 million % (making the Zimbabwean dollar completely worthless); the collapse of the country’s 
manufacturing, tourism and commercial agricultural sectors; the shuttering of banks; mass layoffs 
and unemployment soaring to over 75%; deepening urban and rural poverty and food insecurity. 
Exacerbating the crisis and hardship for ordinary citizens was a government assault on all forms 
of informal activity and a crisis of failure of urban livelihoods.
29
 In 2005, the Mugabe government 
launched Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order/Clear the Trash) which attempted to destroy 
all forms of informality (including housing and livelihoods) in the urban areas of the country. An 
estimated 650,000 to 700,000 people lost their homes and livelihoods. According to Potts, “the 
possible motives for this terrible campaign involved a lethal mix of vindictive electoral politics, a 
particularly strong attachment to planned environments, and a wish to reduce the urban 
population for political and economic reasons. A major (unsuccessful) objective was to forcibly 
displace, to rural areas, those urban people whose houses were demolished”.
30
  
 
Mass out-migration was a “perfectly predictable consequence of Zimbabwe’s economic and 
social collapse”
31
 Zimbabwe was transformed from a migrant receiving to a major global sending 
country in the space of two decades.
32
 The mixed migration “exodus” affected all parts of the 
country and all social and economic strata.
33
 Allied to the globally unprecedented shrinkage of the 
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formal economy, there were what Howard-Hassman has described as “massive human rights 
violations” between 2000 and 2008.
34
 This was a period of intense political conflict and human 
rights abuse in Zimbabwe, as internal and external challenges to the ruling political party, the 
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the government of Robert 
Mugabe intensified. The formation and growth of the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) provided the first real political opposition to ZANU-PF since independence in 
1980 and the government responded with considerable brutality.
35
 
 
The formation of a Government of National Unity in 2009, following national elections, led to a 
decline in political persecution and stabilisation of the shattered economy. Zimbabwe’s national 
economy made a strong recovery between 2009 and 2013, largely due to this political stability, 
the ‘dollarisation’ of the economy (which made US$ legal tender); and a new laissez faire policy 
towards the informal economy on which many households had come to depend.
36
 The period of 
stability and growth came to an abrupt end with the disbanding of the Government of National 
Unity after the 2013 elections and a marked decline in the still fragile economy.
37
 The years 
between 2009 and 2013 do not appear to have led to a slowing or decline in migration out of the 
country, although they made it more difficult for Zimbabweans to obtain refugee status in other 
countries. Clearly, the shocks of a decade of political and economic turmoil up to 2008 were so 
severe that they continued to reverberate.  
 
In the latest Failed States Index, Zimbabwe remains a ‘high alert’ country. The extraordinary 
growth of around 9% during the period 2009 to 2012, albeit from a low base, has disappeared 
and there has been a continuous deceleration since then, from 3.8% growth in 2014 to an 
estimated 1.5% in 2015.
38
 The World Bank estimates feeble economic growth of only 0.4% this 
year for the country.
39
 Zimbabwe is thus a long way from returning to the pre-economic crisis era 
and poverty and food insecurity remain endemic (Figure 1).
40
 The negative effects on agricultural 
productivity of the El Niño-induced drought of 2015 have been compounded by global economic 
slowdown in which commodity prices are low and terms of trade unfavourable to Zimbabwe. In 
recent months, there have been renewed cash shortages, government failure to pay civil servant 
salaries, and growing public discontent over declining economic conditions.  
 
Zimbabwe is therefore again experiencing a downward economic spiral, with emerging political 
fragilities and serious fiscal challenges. An added problem due to the sluggish global economy is 
the weakening of remittance flows to Zimbabwe, which perform a key function in supplementing 
incomes, particularly for the most vulnerable households.
41
 The humanitarian situation is 
deteriorating steadily, with new estimates by the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee 
indicating that 4.1 million persons (42% of the rural population) will need food assistance in early 
2017. This is expected to be the highest level recorded since 2009. 
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Figure 1: Poverty and Food Insecurity in Zimbabwe (2011-2017) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
A major consequence of the protracted economic crisis in Zimbabwe has been extensive 
informalisation of the economy. FinMark Trust estimates that there are now as many as 3.5 
million micro, small and medium enterprises in the country.
42
 Of these, two million (or 71%) are 
individual entrepreneurs and 800,000 (29%) have employees. 46% of the adult population 
nationally are small business owners. Nearly half report that the business is their only source of 
income. Informal cross-border trading (ICBT) with neighbouring countries such as Botswana, 
South Africa and Zambia has also become a significant livelihood activity for many.
43
  
Although the volume of ICBT is unknown, a recent SAMP survey of over 500 traders in Harare 
found that the trade was female-dominated (68% women).
44
 Nearly 90% had started their 
businesses in the post-2000 era and most had never held a formal sector job. The traders cited a 
number of business challenges including long delays at the border, heavy import duties, theft, 
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and competition from other traders. Xenophobia in South Africa was not seen as a significant 
challenge with 78% saying their operations have not been affected by xenophobia at all and only 
4% saying they had been affected a great deal. The primary reason is probably because the 
traders spend so little time in South Africa (an average 1.8 days per visit).  
 
The biggest challenge confronting ICBT traders at the present time is Zimbabwean government 
policy. In June 2016, through Statutory Instrument 64 of 2016, the government banned the 
importation of a wide variety of goods by informal traders including various processed and tinned 
foods, bottled water, dairy products, household furniture, fertiliser, cotton fabric and some building 
materials. The announcement triggered widespread and sometimes violent protests by traders in 
Harare and at the Beitbridge border post between Zimbabwe and South Africa.
45
 Circumventing 
the ban has now become a major clandestine activity by so-called ‘night runners’ who smuggle 
goods into the country on behalf of traders under cover of darkness.
46
   
 
3.2. Migrating Out of Crisis 
 
Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa is not a new phenomenon.
47
 However, unlike other 
neighbouring countries such as Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, the 
numbers of Zimbabweans migrating temporarily to South Africa was relatively limited for much of 
the twentieth century.
48
 In part, this was because most migrants from these other countries 
worked on contract on the South African mines and commercial farms.
49
 Local employers in 
Zimbabwe resisted the efforts of South African industry to recruit labour, fearing a loss of their 
own labour supply.
50
 Indeed, for many decades Zimbabwe was an importer of migrant labourers 
from countries such as Malawi and Mozambique. In the 1970s, there was brief relaxation of this 
policy and the South Africans attempted, with limited success, to recruit Zimbabweans to work on 
the country’s gold mines.
51
 In the 1980s, after independence, many whites left the country and 
were welcomed by the apartheid government of the time. 
 
Contemporary large-scale migration from Zimbabwe has its origins in the structural adjustments 
reforms of the 1990s when growing unemployment started to increase and a brain drain of skilled 
Zimbabweans began. However, it was not until 2000 as the political and economic situation 
began to deteriorate, that migration from Zimbabwe began to accelerate and become far more 
mixed in character.
52
 The 2015 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(UNDESA) Bilateral Migration Database shows Zimbabwean migrants now live in at least 50 
countries worldwide. Of the 856,345 documented Zimbabwean migrants outside the country, 
252,569 (or 29%) were in the North and 603,776 (71%) were in the South.  Neighbouring 
countries such as Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia are the major 
destinations for South–South migrants from Zimbabwe (Table 1). Some countries, especially in 
the North, recognise Zimbabweans as refugees and rates of acceptance of refugee claims are 
relatively high. Others, including South Africa, generally do not and rates are low. Fewer than 1% 
of Zimbabwean applications for asylum have been granted refugee status (amounting to less than 
1,500 in total). Zimbabweans are officially categorised in South Africa as ‘economic migrants’ and 
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are not afforded the rights and protections of the 1998 Refugees Act, including the right to work 
and earn a livelihood.  
 
Table 1:  Major Destination Countries for Zimbabwean Migrants (2015) 
Country of Destination Number of Migrants 
South Africa 475,406 
United Kingdom 132,942 
United States 50,001 
Australia 38,843 
Malawi 36,753 
Botswana 31,625 
Mozambique 25,429 
Zambia 19,503 
Namibia 13,247 
Canada 11,118 
New Zealand 8,416 
Ireland 3,098 
Netherlands 1,423 
Portugal 1,109 
Switzerland 1,074 
Source: Compiled from: UNDESA (2015). International Migrant Stock 2015. Dataset. United Nations.  
 
The only available time series data comes from official South African entry figures collected at 
land and air ports of entry. Data on exits from the country is unavailable. The data set excludes 
undocumented migration but shows how legal entries from Zimbabwe to South Africa (for all 
purposes) began to rise in the early 1990s and peaked in 1995 when the South African 
government imposed visa restrictions on Zimbabweans (Figure 2).The apparent reduction and 
stabilisation in migration numbers during the visa period (1995–2005) was offset by irregular 
migration which increased significantly during this decade. From 2005 onwards, when visa 
requirements were abolished by South Africa, there was an inexorable increase in cross-border 
movement that has shown few signs of abating. There was a small decline in 2007-8, but the 
economic recovery between 2009 and 2012 appears to have had no impact as the numbers 
continued to rise and passed two million per annum for the first time in 2013.    
 
Figure 2: Legal Entries to South Africa from Zimbabwe (1983–2014) 
 
Source: Compiled from Statistics South Africa data  
 12 
The crisis-driven nature of migration from Zimbabwe is reflected in the reasons given by migrants 
for leaving the country. Makina interviewed over 4,000 Zimbabweans in Johannesburg in 2007.
53
 
Figure 2 shows the primary reason given for migration by year of first migration. Political reasons 
were cited as the most important reason for migration between 2002 and 2006 (a period of 
intense political conflict and crisis). After 2006, economic conditions in Zimbabwe and 
employment opportunities in South Africa became the most important factors, as they had been 
before 2001. 
 
Figure 3: Main Reason for Leaving Zimbabwe by Year of Departure  
 
Source: Makina, D. (2010), p.229.  
 
SAMP’s survey of 500 Zimbabwean migrants who had come to South Africa between 2005 and 
2010 confirmed the importance of poor economic prospects and living conditions in Zimbabwe as 
drivers of migration, with 84% citing overall living conditions, and 44% citing food and hunger as 
reasons for migrating (Table 2).
54
 Given continued limited job opportunities in Zimbabwe, the 
main pull factors were the search for formal and informal employment in South Africa (given by 71% 
and 30% of interviewees respectively). The decline in forced migration first observed by Makina is 
clear with only 11% of the migrants giving political persecution or the search for asylum as a 
reason for migrating from Zimbabwe.
55
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Table 2:  Reasons for Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa (2005–2010) 
Push Factors % 
Overall living conditions 84.0 
Food/hunger 44.4 
Education/ schools 13.2 
Safety of self/family 15.0 
Asylum 6.2 
Political exile 4.6 
Drought 4.2 
Pull Factors % 
Informal sector job 71.2 
Formal sector job 30.2 
Moved with family 16.4 
Attractions of urban life 6.2 
Marriage 5.6 
Freedom/democracy/peace 2.6 
Sent to live with family 1.4 
Housing 0.3 
Note: multiple response question 
Source: SAMP 
 
Zimbabwe’s crisis-driven migration is not confined to job-seekers or one particular demographic 
or age group, however. The Zimbabwean migrant population in South Africa is extremely 
heterogeneous and comprises both sexes (in roughly equal numbers), all age groups from young 
children to seniors, and all education and skill levels. Crush et al. found that there were more 
female migrants, a greater proportion of youth migrants, and many more unmarried migrants and 
sons and daughters in households than in the past (Table 3).
56
 Not captured in this table was the 
increase in family migration and unaccompanied child migration.
57
    
 
Betts and Kaytaz label the exodus from Zimbabwe an example of “survival migration” which they 
define as including refugees and also “people who are forced to cross an international border to 
flee state failure, severe environmental distress, or widespread livelihood collapse”.
58
 Under 
conditions of survival migration, the traditional distinction between refugees and economic 
migrants breaks down.
59
 The argument that all Zimbabwean migrants should be defined as 
‘survival migrants’, while superficially attractive, requires closer scrutiny. For example, it is based 
in part on the view that conditions in Zimbabwe are so dire that out-migration for survival is the 
only option.  
 
However, this does not explain why the majority of Zimbabweans have not left nor the role of 
migration in reducing pressures for further out-migration through remittances.
60
 The argument 
that all Zimbabweans are ‘survival migrants’ also runs the danger of homogenising migrant flows 
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and downplaying the heterogeneity of migration movement out of the country. The argument that 
all migrants from Zimbabwe are ‘survival migrants’ also seems to rest on the admittedly 
desperate situation of migrants in squalid transit shelters in the border town of Musina and at 
overcrowded safe havens such as the Central Methodist Church in Johannesburg.
61
 The idea of 
‘survival migration’ fits with this sub-set of Zimbabwean migrants but certainly does not 
encompass them all. 
 
Table 3:  Demographic Profile of Zimbabwean Migrants (2010) 
Sex % 
Male 56 
Female 44 
Age 
15 – 24 31 
25 – 39 59  
>40 10 
Marital Status  
Unmarried 49 
Married 41 
Formerly married * 10 
Status in Household  
Household Head  28  
Spouse  15 
Sons/Daughters  43 
Other Family  12 
Other  2 
* Separated/divorced/abandoned/widowed 
Source: Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2015b). 
 
Far from being the desperate and destitute people conveyed by images of ‘survival migration’, 
many Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa exhibit considerable ingenuity, industry and energy. 
Crush et al. found that 62% of post-2004 Zimbabwean migrants surveyed in Cape Town and 
Johannesburg were employed and another 20% worked in the informal economy.
62
 Only 18% 
were unemployed including 14% who had never had a job in South Africa. At the same time, 
increasing numbers were doing more menial jobs including a quarter in manual work, 13% in the 
service industry and 8% in domestic work (Table 4). A longitudinal study of day labourers in 
Tshwane clearly demonstrates the increase in Zimbabweans seeking casual work from 7% in 
2004 to 33% in 2007 to 45% in 2015 (Figure 4).
63
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Table 4:  Occupations of Zimbabwean Migrants (2010) 
 % 
Manual worker 23.8 
Professional 14.1 
Service worker 12.6 
Domestic worker 8.4 
Security  4.1 
Office worker  4.1 
Student 2.9 
Employer/manager  1.0 
Unemployed 18.0 
 
One of the major consequences of migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa has been a reverse 
flow of remittances in cash and goods, particularly food. Without remittances the flow of migrants 
from Zimbabwe to South Africa would have been even larger since remittances exercised a 
stabilising effect and encouraged some family members to remain behind.
64
 There is 
considerable evidence that remittances are primarily used for basic household expenditures such 
as food, clothing, health and education.
65
 The actual volume of remittances, and how this might 
have changed over time, is not known since the use of informal channels is common.
66
 The World 
Bank bilateral remittances database contains a blank cell for remittance flows from South Africa 
to Zimbabwe. Two recent studies have estimated the total annual amount of cash remittances 
from South Africa to Zimbabwe at between ZAR 5 and ZAR 7 billion (3 and 5 billion EUR).
67
 
However, both estimates are based on the remitting behaviour of small samples and 
unsubstantiated assumptions about the size of the Zimbabwean population in South Africa. 
 
Makina and Masenge argue that the level of remitting first increases with the time spent in South 
Africa and later declines after an estimated 8 years of migration experience.
68
 They also found 
that the level of remittances was positively related to the number of dependents in Zimbabwe, 
legal status, access to banking, and income and savings levels, and negatively related to 
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education level, return intentions, frequency of home visits and economic and political reasons for 
migrating. On the other hand, Crush et al.’s study of Zimbabwean migrants who arrived in South 
Africa for the first time after 2004 argues that this cohort remits less, and less frequently, than its 
predecessors.
69
 They attribute this to the greater incidence of family migration and the fact that 
the nature of migration is changing with greater interest amongst migrants in settling permanently 
or semi-permanently in South Africa.  
 
Figure 4: Zimbabwean Day Labourers in Tshwane (2004–2015)  
 
Source: Blaauw, D., Pretorius, A. and Schenck, R. (2016), p.3.  
 
The legal status of Zimbabweans in South Africa has fluctuated over time. At present, most 
Zimbabweans in South Africa either hold work permits or short-term visitor’s permits which allow 
a stay of up to 90 days. The number holding wok permits greatly increased (to close to 300,000) 
in 2010 when the South African government introduced an immigration amnesty for 
Zimbabweans (see below). Prior to that, many Zimbabweans had been applying for, and 
automatically receiving, asylum-seeker permits. Very few Zimbabweans (less than 3,000) have 
ever been granted full refugee status in South Africa. At the present time, around 20-30,000 
Zimbabweans per annum are still acquiring asylum-seeker permits. The numbers who are in the 
country without any documentation or who entered legally and have overstayed is unknown but is 
probably not as large as the media often claims (that is, in the millions). The Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement has never been 
implemented so has had no material effect on facilitating migration from Zimbabwe. 
 
                                                 
69
 Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2015b). 
17 
 
3.3. South African Policy Responses to Crisis Migration 
 
Polzer has reviewed the response of the South African government to the political and economic 
crisis in Zimbabwe and observed that “a rapid influx of hundreds of thousands of people would be 
treated by most countries as a serious crisis requiring immediate attention”.
70
 On the contrary, 
South Africa’s official reaction to this movement has been characterised by “a studied 
determination not to acknowledge that anything is out of the ordinary”.
71
 In May 2007, President 
Thabo Mbeki even noted that the influx was just “something we have to live with”.
72
 In general, 
what has struck most observers about the South African response is the “totality of the silence” 
from Parliament and the central government. The failure to provide any kind of strategic policy 
response to the influx is seen as consistent with South Africa’s foreign policy of accommodation 
of the Mugabe regime and associated downplaying and minimisation of the magnitude of the 
crisis in Zimbabwe itself.
73
  
 
The policy silence towards crisis-driven migration from Zimbabwe did not mean paralysis on the 
ground, as the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) and the South African Police Services (SAPS) 
intensified efforts to identify, arrest and deport Zimbabweans from South Africa back to Zimbabwe. 
Between 2000 and 2013, South Africa deported over two million migrants, of whom 960,000 (or 
42%) were from Zimbabwe (Table 5). Deportations peaked in 2007 and 2008, when the economic 
crisis in Zimbabwe was at its most severe. In part of 2010 and 2011, there was a temporary 
moratorium on deportations to Zimbabwe, which resumed again in 2012. There is little evidence 
that mass deportations were anything other than a costly failure as most of those deported soon 
returned.
74
 The deportation machinery was also plagued by bribery, corruption and abuse of 
migrants’ basic human rights.
75
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Table 5:  Deportations of Zimbabweans from South Africa (2000–2013) 
Year Number of Zimbabwean 
deportations 
Total deportations from 
South Africa 
Zimbabwean 
deportations as % 
of total 
deportations 
2000 45,922 145,575 31.5 
2001 47,697 156,123 30.6 
2002 38,118 135,870 28.1 
2003 55,753 164,808 33.8 
2004 72,112 167,137 43.1 
2005 97,433 209,988 46.4 
2006 109,532 266,067 41.2 
2007 204,827 312,733 65.5 
2008 164,678 280,837 58.6 
2009 35,693 105,960 33.7 
2010 4,805 56,793 8.5 
2011 10,100 65,383 15.4 
2012 38,897 103,259 37.8 
2013 35,251 113,554 31.0 
Totals 960,818 2,284,787 42.1 
Source: DHA (South Africa) Annual Reports 
 
Mass deportations prompted an immediate counter-response by many migrants who were 
seeking to legalise their stay in South Africa. Under Section 22 of South Africa’s 1998 Refugees 
Act, all asylum-seekers are entitled to apply for and be granted a six month renewable asylum-
seekers permit which legalises their stay in the country. The law was unclear on whether asylum-
seekers (as opposed to refugee permit holders) were allowed to work or study in the country.  In 
2003, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that asylum-seekers did, in fact, have 
such rights in a case involving the Minister of Home Affairs versus Muriel Watchenuka, a 
Zimbabwean migrant in South Africa.
76
 While the new South African Green Paper on International 
Migration proposes to deny asylum-seekers such rights, from 2003 to the present they have been 
able to work and study pending adjudication of their application for refugee status.
77
   
 
As a direct result of the Watchenuka judgement, as well as the intensification of deportations, 
Zimbabwean applications for asylum rose from less than 200 in 2002 to nearly 20,000 in 2006 
and to almost 150,000 in 2009 (Figure 5). Thus, the unintended consequence of mass 
deportations and the ‘total silence’ surrounding a coherent policy response to crisis migration 
from Zimbabwe was that South Africa’s refugee determination system was quickly overwhelmed 
by Zimbabwean asylum-seekers. Applications by Zimbabweans for asylum comprised more than 
half (51%) of the total received in South Africa during the period 2000-2012. In 2010 alone, 
Zimbabweans made up 81% of the applications for asylum. A total of 587,520 asylum 
applications were received from Zimbabweans in South Africa between 2003 and 2015, of which 
only 153,924 (26%) were adjudicated. However, only 1,292 Zimbabweans were granted refugee 
status over the entire period (an approval rate of less than 1% and amongst the lowest globally), 
adding credence to the view that the South African government considers Zimbabwean asylum-
seekers to be economic rather than forced migrants (Table 6).  
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Table 6:  Adjudication of Zimbabwean Refugee Claims (2003–2015) 
Year Applications Decisions Approved Rejected Approval 
Rate % 
2003 2,588 25 9 16 36.0 
2004 5,789 93 24 69 25.8 
2005 7,783 271 83 187 30.7 
2006 18,973 1,981 103 1,878 5.2 
2007 17,667 1,894 271 1,623 14.3 
2008 111,968 0 0 0 0.0 
2009 149,453 15,701 200 15,370 1.3 
2010 146,566 33,179 429 32,750 1.3 
2011 51,031 15,987 83 15,904 0.5 
2012 20,842 16,926 9 16,881 0.1 
2013 16,670 16,816 65 15,978 0.4 
2014 20,405 33,855 16 32,811 0.1 
2015 17,785 17,206 0 17,203 0.0 
Totals 587,520 153,934 1,292 150,670 0.8 
Source: Compiled from:  UNHCR Population Statistics database (2016).  
 
Figure 5: Zimbabwean Asylum Applications in South Africa (2000–2010) 
 
Source: Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2015b). 
 
The resort to asylum-seeker permits by Zimbabwean migrants mean that the South African 
refugee determination system became so overburdened that an asylum-seeker permit effectively 
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operated as a work permit.
78
 To encourage Zimbabweans out of the refugee protection system 
and reset the clock, the government offered an “immigration amnesty” to Zimbabwean migrants in 
2010 – the Zimbabwe Dispensation Programme or ZDP – with four-year residence and work 
permits.
79
 Around 270,000 migrants took advantage of the offer. In 2014, new permits were 
issued for another 4 years.  
 
Makina found a relatively high intention to return to Zimbabwe amongst his Johannesburg 
interviewees.
80
 Two-thirds of his interviewees indicated that they intended to return and only a 
third said they intended to stay. Intention to return was positively related to sex (with males more 
likely to return than females), the reason for migrating (with those who left for economic reasons 
more likely than those who left for political reasons), whether or not they had dependants they 
supported in Zimbabwe (with those without dependants more likely to stay), level of education 
(with the more educated more likely than the less educated), economic activity, income (with 
higher earners less likely to return) and length of stay in South Africa (with recent migrants more 
likely to expect to return). Amongst migrants who had migrated in the worst years of the 
Zimbabwean crisis (between 2005 and 2010), however, Crush et al. found that 46% intended to 
stay for a few years and 21% to stay in South Africa indefinitely.
81
 Another indicator of growing 
intention to remain in South Africa is the frequency of return visits to Zimbabwe. As Table 7 
shows there was a marked difference between Zimbabwean migrants canvassed in 2005 and 
2010. 
Table 7:  Frequency of Return to Zimbabwe 
 2005 (%) 2010 (%) 
At Least Once A Month 31 <1 
Every Few Months 19 9 
Once or Twice A Year 26 28 
Less Frequently 25 9 
Not Returned 0 46 
Cannot Return 0 3 
Will Never Return 0 2 
Source: Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2015b). 
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4. The Crisis of Xenophobia in South Africa 
 
4.1. Xenophobic Violence in 2008  
 
The crisis of xenophobia in South Africa is generally associated with the ‘perfect storm’ of anti-
migrant violence of May 2008. However, the ‘crisis’ is better viewed as an ongoing phenomenon 
with a number of different dimensions. First, there is pervasive negative attitudes and 
stereotyping among the general population of migrants and refugees, from the rest of Africa in 
particular. The strength of these xenophobic attitudes have been repeatedly demonstrated in 
attitudinal surveys.
82
 Second, xenophobic treatment of migrants and refugees, often accompanied 
by hostile rhetoric and hate speech, has been well-documented in the public health sector, in 
schools and on the streets, including against many Zimbabwean migrants.
83
 Third, xenophobic 
attitudes, language and treatment are all pre-conditions for xenophobic violence. Misago et al. 
describe the link as follows
84
:  
 
“Xenophobia in South Africa translates into a broad spectrum of behaviours including 
discriminatory, stereotyping and dehumanizing remarks; discriminatory policies and 
practices by government and private officials such as exclusion from public services to 
which target groups are entitled; selective enforcement of by-laws by local authorities; 
assault and harassment by state agents particularly the police and immigration officials; 
as well as public threats and violence commonly known as xenophobic violence that 
often results in massive loss of lives and livelihoods.” 
 
This report focuses primarily on xenophobic violence (or extreme xenophobia), which has been 
characterised above as manifesting in both an acute and chronic form. Violent attacks on 
migrants and refugees in South Africa have been documented from as early as the mid-1990s. 
Some of these incidents certainly affected migrants from Zimbabwe: 
 
 In late 1994 and early 1995 in Alexandra, Johannesburg, an aggressive campaign called 
buyelekhaya (literally ‘go home’) unfolded when armed youth groups attempted to forcibly 
remove Mozambican, Zimbabwean and Malawian migrants, holding them responsible for 
increased crimes and unemployment. Some of the affected migrants were long-time 
residents of this township;  
 In 2001, after a Zimbabwean migrant was blamed for the death of a South African 
woman, local residents attacked many migrants from Zimbabwe, ransacked 124 shacks 
and burned 74, and forced the occupants to abandon the Zandspruit settlement outside 
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Johannesburg. South African women in relationships with Zimbabwean males were also 
attacked;  
 In 2005, Zimbabwean and Somali refugees were assaulted by residents during a protest 
against the municipality in Bothaville, Free State. Some 80 refugees were displaced and 
robbed of all their belongings;  
 In 2006, two Zimbabweans were killed during clashes between South Africans and non-
South Africans in the informal settlement of Olievenhoutbosch. Some Zimbabweans left 
the settlement and returned home; 
 In 2007, after an altercation between a South African and Zimbabwean family spiralled 
out of control in Mooiplaas, Gauteng, local residents attacked migrants from Zimbabwe, 
resulting in two deaths, eleven injuries and ransacking of over 100 migrant-run 
businesses; 
 In March and April 2008, Zimbabwean migrants were attacked in the informal settlement 
of Diepsloot in northern Johannesburg, resulting in three deaths and the destruction of 
migrant homes. 
 
The important point is that xenophobic attacks on Zimbabwean migrants pre-dated the nationwide 
violence of May 2008. The attacks that month began in Alexandra in Johannesburg where a mob 
began attacking the homes of all those they deemed to be “outsiders”.
85
 What started as an 
isolated incident within this settlement soon engulfed many different locations in Gauteng 
province and then spread to other provinces, including the Western and Eastern Cape.
86
 Violence 
was also reported from KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo. Although anyone perceived as a ‘foreigner’ 
in the affected communities came under attack, some accounts suggested that certain migrant 
groups such as Zimbabweans were being especially targeted. South Africa’s Mail & Guardian 
newspaper reported that in settlements like Cleveland near Johannesburg, Zimbabweans were 
singled out, resulting in five deaths and fifty injured migrants.
87
 By mid-May, the violence had 
spread to Cape Town, where many migrants, including Zimbabweans, were being viciously 
assaulted.
88
   
 
By the time the xenophobic violence subsided, there had been at least 60 murders, dozens of 
rapes and 700 serious injuries, and more than 100,000 migrants had been displaced from their 
homes to 90 temporary shelters around the country.
89
 Property and possessions worth millions of 
ZAR were looted or destroyed. A Parliamentary Task Team investigating the violence noted that 
the “impact of the violence and attacks was severe as many people were gripped by fear and 
experienced the trauma of people being evicted from their homes, being physically assaulted, 
killed and in some instances, burnt”.
90
 Many of those who were displaced during the May 2008 
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violence elected not to return to the settlements from which they were displaced for fear of further 
attacks. Early returnees faced renewed violence or were murdered at various locations.
91
  
 
4.2. Xenophobic Violence in the Informal Economy 
 
While the mob violence of May 2008 remains unmatched in its ferocity, scale and devastating 
impact, xenophobic attacks did not cease thereafter. The main shift has been in the targeting of 
certain migrants. The violence of May 2008 was relatively indiscriminate. Mob attacks since that 
time have increasingly focused on migrant and refugee business owners in the informal 
economy.
92
 Between mid-2009 and late 2010, for example, there were at least 20 deaths, 200 
foreign-owned shops looted and more than 4,000 displaced due to violence targeting migrants. In 
2012, there were 140 deaths and 250 serious injuries. And in early 2014, an estimated 200 shops 
were looted and 900 persons were displaced.
93
 Crush and Ramachandran document 220 
episodes of collective violence against migrants and refugee businesses in various locations 
around the country between 2005 and 2014 (not including May 2008).
94
 The violence has 
increased in frequency over time (Table 6). Pre-2005 incidents constitute less than 5% of 
recorded episodes. A definite upswing is seen from 2006 onwards, with the sharpest growth 
occurring after 2008. Excluding events in May 2008, nearly 90% of episodes of group violence 
against migrant businesses were recorded since the beginning of 2008. The five years with the 
largest number of incidents were from 2010 to 2014. The highest annual number (20% of the total) 
was recorded in 2010.  
 
Table 8:  Frequency of Collective Xenophobic Attacks 
Year No. of Incidents % of Total 
Pre-2005 9 4 
2005 4 2 
2006 9 4 
2007 9 4 
2008 19 8 
2009 17 7 
2010 46 20 
2011 22 10 
2012 25 11 
2013 36 16 
2014 (to end-August) 32 14 
Total 228 100 
Source: Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2015a). 
 
The majority of South African provinces have been affected by collective violence against 
migrant-owned businesses. In 2005-6, incidents occurred in six distinct locations within three 
provinces. In 2009, they occurred in at least 14 separate locations extending over six of the nine 
provinces in South Africa. In 2010, there were at least 37 separate locations situated in six 
provinces. The number of affected areas fell somewhat to 22 in 2012 and 27 in 2013, but the 
number of affected provinces was still six and seven respectively. In general, the Western Cape 
and Gauteng have experienced the highest levels of this form of xenophobic violence.   
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Each episode of collective violence targeting small businesses includes some combination of the 
following: written or verbal threats and insults; public intimidation through protests or marches; 
forced shop closures; direct physical assaults of migrant store owners or their employees; looting 
of store contents; damage to the physical structure of shops, especially through arson; damage or 
destruction of other business property belonging to migrants, including homes and cars; 
temporary or permanent forced displacement of migrant entrepreneurs and their families from an 
area; and extortion for protection by local leaders, police and residents.  The nature and intensity 
of the violence against migrants between 2008 and 2015 is illustrated by a brief description of 
some of the attacks reported in the media: 
  
 In 2009 in De Doorns, Western Cape, local residents looted and destroyed the homes of 
Zimbabwean migrants, accusing them of stealing jobs from citizens and accepting lower 
wages.
95
 Migrants from this country were singled out for attacks and an estimated 3,000 
migrants were forcibly displaced. Seven Zimbabwean migrants were killed in the informal 
settlement of Stofland after they were cornered in a shack which was set ablaze. 
 In 2011, in Lebokwagamo near Polokwane, residents attacked migrants living in the area, 
looting and damaging their homes and businesses. 
 In 2011, many Zimbabweans living in Seshego township near Polokwane in Limpopo 
Province were forcibly displaced following attacks by large groups of local residents 
during which one migrant was stoned to death.  
 In 2012, more than 700 shops were looted and/or destroyed and over 500 migrants were 
displaced because of public violence in Botshabelo in the Free State province.  
 In 2012, four spaza shops (informal convenience shops) were bombed in Mitchells Plain, 
Cape Town, after their migrant owners refused to pay protection money.  
 In 2012, two Bangladeshi traders suffered third degree burns and later died after a group 
of assailants threw a petrol-bomb on their container store in Thokoza and blocked the 
store’s entrance preventing their escape. Three shops were petrol-bombed during large-
scale looting of Somali-owned businesses in the Valhalla Park area of Cape Town. 
 In 2013, after an altercation in Duduza on the East Rand over a cellphone airtime 
voucher between a Somali shop owner and a local youth, who was shot, some 200 
stores belonging to Somali, Ethiopian, Eritrean and Bangladeshi migrants were stripped 
of their contents and several structures were incinerated.  
 In 2013, more than 150 migrant-owned shops were looted in four days in Port Elizabeth. 
A Somali refugee, Abdi Nasir Mahmoud Good, was publicly stoned to death while 
attempting to salvage his belongings from his ransacked store.  
 In 2013, more than 200 migrant shopkeepers operating small-scale businesses in the 
town of Delmas east of Johannesburg were forced to close their stores after a spate of 
attacks against them.  
 In 2014, two refugees were killed when nearly 100 migrant businesses were looted or 
torched in Mamelodi East outside Pretoria. The violence was repeated in the Phomolong 
area of Pretoria two months later when three persons were killed and several others were 
wounded during a rampage that lasted for three weeks.  
 In 2015 there were sustained xenophobic attacks in Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape.  
More than 500 people were displaced and more than 300 shops and homes looted and, 
in some cases, destroyed. 
 
South African competitors in the informal economy have increasingly adopted a strategy of 
“violent entrepreneurship”; that is, the use of violence to intimidate and drive migrant 
entrepreneurs out of an area.
96
 A distinctive feature is the emergence and incendiary stance of 
loosely formed groups, purportedly representing many or all South African small business owners. 
These groups range from localised structures like the Zanokhanyo Retailers’ Association 
operating in townships, settlements and urban areas such as Khayelitsha, to larger regional 
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forums like the innocuously-named Greater Gauteng Business Forum. The Middelburg Small 
Business Community Forum claimed credit for mobilising local authorities after the Steve 
Tshwete Municipality shut down fifty Somali-owned shops and refused to issue them with trading 
licenses to these traders. Accusing them of unfair competition and rising crime, the local Forum 
stoked group violence against migrant-run shops in Lephalale in Limpopo in 2013 in the course of 
which five shops, two houses and three vehicles were razed. Such groups have engaged in 
numerous public hate campaigns against migrant businesses, liberally using belligerent tactics 
ranging from forced store closures, coerced increase of store prices, limits on the number of 
migrant businesses in an area, and public threats through letters or by radio.   
 
4.3. Xenophobic Violence in 2015 
 
A second major wave of xenophobic violence erupted in Kwazulu Natal in early 2015 following a 
labour strike in Isipingo, Durban, where a supermarket owner was accused (incorrectly) of 
employing foreign migrants to break a labour strike and residents began looting and burning 
foreign-owned shops. The violence escalated after the traditionalist Zulu leader King Goodwill 
Zwelethini reportedly denounced foreign nationals and businesses in a public speech attended by 
the Minister of Police and demanded that they leave the country.
97
  Almost immediately, the anti-
migrant violence spread rapidly from Isipingo to other places in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, 
including Chatsworth, Sydenham, Malukazi and KwaMashu.
98
 Within days, mob violence also 
broke out in and around Johannesburg, including in Soweto, leading to further loss of life, 
displacement of thousands and large-scale damage to property. A good deal of the March 2015 
violence targeted informal business owners in KwaZulu Natal, Gauteng and Limpopo. Large 
numbers of migrant-owned businesses were looted and torched in towns in all three provinces. 
The Ethiopian Community in Kwazulu Natal later claimed that 600–700 shops owned by its 
members were targeted and burnt and six people were burnt alive inside their shops.
99
 
 
The Special Reference Group (SRG), an independent commission of enquiry appointed by the 
KwaZulu-Natal provincial government and headed by Judge Navi Pillay (formerly the United 
Nations Commissioner for Human Rights), investigated the violence and released its 150-page 
report in late 2015.
100
 The SRG reported that over 5,000 displaced migrants in KwaZulu-Natal 
were temporarily housed in shelters outside the areas affected by the violence. A census of the 
shelters on 21 April 2015 recorded 5,603 people of whom the majority were Malawians (3,399), 
Mozambicans (1,074) and Zimbabweans (667) (SRG, 2015: 122). While some of the displaced 
migrants were directly attacked, many more fled their homes out of fear because of widely 
circulating rumours about fresh violence (SRG, 2015). A Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
psychologist visited the camps and observed: 
 
“The kind of trauma I saw in the Chatsworth camp is similar to what I’ve seen in 
displacement camps in Central African Republic and South Sudan where people have 
been exposed to active conflicts. From our interviews with these camp residents it’s clear 
that some have suffered cumulative traumas. They have experienced violence in their 
countries of origin; again during the 2008 xenophobic violence; and yet again in 2015. 
However, they also tell us about the daily level of discrimination and alienation they 
experience – at hospitals, in minibus taxis and from the police.”
101
 
 
The SRG argued that the immediate cause of the outbreak of violence was “deliberate efforts of 
select individuals, some of whom had interests in the informal trading sector, to drive away 
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competition by foreign national-owned businesses… These deliberate efforts sparked the 
outbreak of widespread incidents of criminality, violence and looting of properties owned by 
foreign nationals”.
102
 Furthermore, “many of the perceptions of foreign national traders, although 
largely unfounded, contributed to heightened tensions”: 
 
“Competition between local and foreign national communities in the small enterprise and 
informal business sector is amongst the most divisive and immediate causes of the 
violent attacks. The rapidly changing environment of the informal ‘spaza and tuck shop’ 
sector, characterised by the entrance of large retail chains into the townships, has 
resulted in the displacement of many traders. Foreign national traders appear to find 
ways of surviving in this competitive environment.”
103
  
 
Interestingly, the SRG studiously avoided labelling the violence as xenophobic or seeing 
xenophobia as a contributing or even motivating factor. At most, it conceded that “the violent 
attacks against foreign nationals were, in some measure, fuelled by dominant and negative 
perceptions that exist amongst locals and foreign nationals about one another”.
104
 However, it is 
hard to see how the attitudes of foreign nationals could be responsible for their own victimisation. 
Also, none of the mob violence was perpetrated by migrants on South Africans. An anti-
xenophobia protest march organised by NGOs and migrant groups to City Hall on 7 April was 
actually declared illegal and the police used water cannons, teargas and rubber bullets to 
disperse the crowd.  
 
The SRG’s view that the attitudes of migrants towards South Africans were equally culpable in 
“fuelling” the violence seems misplaced and a clear example of xenophobia denialism.
105
 The Ad 
Hoc Parliamentary Committee’s investigation of the 2015 violence went even further, repeatedly 
asserting that xenophobia as a phenomenon does not exist in South Africa.
106
 Citing a standard 
dictionary definition of xenophobia as an attitudinal orientation of “fear, hostility and dislike” of 
foreigners, the Committee claimed that South Africans do not hate or loathe migrants and 
refugees. In the parliamentary deliberations leading up to the adoption of the report, it was 
recommended that the term ‘xenophobia’ be omitted completely from the report because no 
convincing evidence had apparently been found that the phenomenon even existed.
107
 The final 
report notes that “Parliament had not yet come to the conclusion that the incidents of violence 
against foreign nationals were due to xenophobia as per the dictionary definition of extreme, 
irrational hatred of foreign nationals”.
108
 Instead, the report focuses on “increased economic 
competition” between citizens and migrants, and the growing entry of unskilled migrants whose 
presence supposedly disadvantages the poorest citizens.  
 
4.4. Explanations for Xenophobic Violence 
 
Crush and Ramachandran classify explorations of the relationship between xenophobia and 
violence into three main types: (a) denialism (which essentially denies that xenophobia even 
exists and that the violence was the actions of criminal elements looting for material gain); (b) 
minimalism (which argues that xenophobia may exist but is an epiphenomenon and that the 
structural causes are grinding poverty and dissatisfaction with government).
109
 Minimalists also 
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argue that South Africans are equally vulnerable to violence as ‘foreigners’; and (c) realism which 
sees the rise of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa and the pre-disposition of a significant 
minority of South Africans to use violent means to drive ‘foreigners’ out of their communities as a 
prime causes of the attacks. Examples of all three positions can be found in both the research 
literature and the public pronouncements of politicians and officials (see below).   
 
A national survey by SAMP in 2010 asked a representative sample of South Africans in violence-
affected areas why they thought the violence of May 2008 had occurred.
110
 Many reproduced the 
common negative stereotypes of migrants as a way of explaining the violence, implying that 
migrants themselves were to blame: they were criminals, cheat South Africans, use the public 
health system without paying, take jobs from South Africans, and take housing earmarked for 
South Africans. These explanations all suggest, in one way or another, a belief that the presence 
of migrants materially disadvantages South Africans and that this precipitates violence against 
them. However, nearly two-thirds of interviewees attributed the violence to non-material factors 
including that that migrants are “culturally different”, “do not belong in South Africa” and “steal 
South African women” (a paternalistic and disparaging reference to marriages between South 
African women and migrant men). 
 
Table 9:  Explanations for May 2008 Violence by South Africans 
Explanations % Agreed 
Migrants cause crime in South Africa 70 
Migrants cheat South Africans 66 
Migrants are culturally different 64 
Migrants use health services for free 63 
Migrants do not belong in South Africa 62 
Migrants take jobs from South Africans 58 
Migrants take RDP houses from South Africans 57 
Migrants steal South African women 57 
Source: Crush, J., Ramachandran, S. and Pendleton, W. (2013). 
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5. Zimbabweans in the South African Informal Economy 
 
5.1. Migration Profile  
 
The extent of participation by Zimbabwean migrants in the informal economy is not known with 
any certainty. SAMP’s 2005 national survey of migrant-sending households in Zimbabwe found 
that 21% of migrants outside the country employed in non-agricultural work were working in the 
informal economy (although this included all destinations not just South Africa).
111
 Makina’s 
survey of migrants in Johannesburg found that 19% were working as hawkers or artisans.
112
 
SAMP’s 2010 survey of recent Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg and Cape Town found 
that 27% were working or deriving income from the informal economy.
113
  Crush and Tawodzera’s 
survey of the food insecurity of Zimbabwean households in South Africa found that 36% of 
household members in employment were working in the informal economy.
114
 While no more 
than indicative, these studies suggest that somewhere between 20–30% of Zimbabwean 
migrants in major South African cities could be involved in the informal economy. They also 
suggest that the importance of informal sector employment to Zimbabweans has increased over 
time. 
 
A demographic profile of Zimbabwean informal business-owners in Cape Town and 
Johannesburg can be constructed from the SAMP survey of 304 entrepreneurs. First, the survey 
found a distinct gender bias in both cities with 60% of the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in Cape 
Town and 65% of those in Johannesburg being male. This is in marked contrast to the business 
of informal cross-border trading between Zimbabwe and South Africa which is dominated by 
female Zimbabwean entrepreneurs.
115
 Compared to other groups of migrants in the South African 
informal economy, however, women are better represented. Women comprised 30% of the entire 
sample of migrant entrepreneurs in Cape Town and 27% in Johannesburg (compared with 40% 
and 35% of the Zimbabwean sub-sample).  
 
Second, the age profile of Zimbabwean migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa is heavily slanted 
towards youth (Figure 4). Adopting the ILO definition of youth in Africa as anyone under the age 
of 35, then 75% of those operating in Cape Town and 50% of those in Johannesburg qualify as 
youth entrepreneurs.
116
 At the other end of the age spectrum, there were more older Zimbabwean 
migrant entrepreneurs in Johannesburg with 22% over the age of 45 compared to only 10% of 
those operating in Cape Town.  
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Figure 6: Age Profile of Zimbabwean Informal Entrepreneurs 
 
 
Third, the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs were relatively well-educated (Table 10). The proportion 
with no education at all was around 9% (which was higher than both the South African adult 
population as a whole and South African migrants working in the informal economy surveyed in 
2016 in another SAMP study). However, half of the Zimbabweans had either finished high school 
or had a tertiary qualification (compared to 42% of the South African population and only 27% of 
the South African entrepreneurs). In general, Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in Cape Town appear 
to be much better educated than those in Johannesburg. 
 
Table 10: Educational Levels of Zimbabwean Entrepreneurs and South Africans 
  
Zimbabwean 
Entrepreneurs 
(%) 
All South  
Africans (2011 
Census) 
(%) 
South African 
Migrant 
Entrepreneurs 
2016 (%) 
No formal schooling 9.2 8.6 2.4 
Primary only 6.9 16.9 16.2 
Some high school 36.8 33.9 43.3 
High school diploma 32.6 28.9 16.8 
Post-secondary qualifications 14.5 11.8 10.0 
 
5.2. Drivers of Migration to South Africa 
 
The number of interviewed migrant entrepreneurs who arrived in South Africa peaked in the crisis 
years between 2005 and 2010 at the height of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe and appears to 
have fallen thereafter (Table 11). Less than 2% had migrated to South Africa before 1994. Nearly 
18% of the Johannesburg migrant entrepreneurs had moved there before 2000 compared to only 
2% of those in Cape Town. Over time, Cape Town has become increasingly attractive as a 
destination. As many as 88% of the migrants in Cape Town arrived in the city after 2005 
(compared to 52% of those who moved to Johannesburg).   
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Table 11: Year of Arrival in South Africa 
  
Total 
% 
 Cape Town 
% 
Johannesburg 
% 
Before 1994 1.6  0.8 2.2 
1994-1999 10.2  1.7 15.6 
2000-2004 22.4  9.3 30.6 
2005-2009 42.4  55.1 34.4 
2010-2014 23.4  33.1 17.2 
 
The reasons for migration to South Africa were clearly related to the ongoing economic crisis in 
Zimbabwe. The interviewees were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a series of 
statements and over 80% agreed with the proposition that that they had come to South Africa in 
order to provide for family back home. As many as 73% also agreed that they had come to South 
Africa to look for employment (Figure 7). There was a marked difference between the 
Johannesburg and Cape Town entrepreneurs (with 82% and 59% in agreement respectively) 
which may reflect differences in the perception (and reality) of labour market access in the two 
cities. The reverse was true with regard to starting a business as a reason for migration with 56% 
in Cape Town and 35% in Johannesburg in agreement. In general, this suggests that 
Johannesburg is seen as a place where it is easier to obtain formal sector employment and Cape 
Town is a more amenable location for starting an informal business. 
 
Figure 7: Reasons for Migrating to South Africa 
 
 
Unemployment was a significant driver of migration to South Africa, with 39% of the sample 
reporting that they were unemployed prior to leaving Zimbabwe (Table 12).  Again, there was a 
marked difference between the entrepreneurs in the two cities: only 20% of the Cape Town 
interviewees were unemployed prior to leaving compared with 51% of the Johannesburg 
interviewees. This is not especially consistent with the finding about the more recent pattern of 
migration to Cape Town since we would expect higher levels of unemployment amongst more 
recent migrants. Distance and cost might therefore play a mitigating role in the choice of 
destinations as unemployed individuals could find it easier to raise the funds to travel the shorter 
distance to Johannesburg. Cape Town is obviously much further afield and those with jobs in 
Zimbabwe might also have had the resources to get to Cape Town. 
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Table 12: Occupation Prior to Leaving Zimbabwe 
  
Total 
% 
Cape Town 
% 
Johannesburg 
% 
Unemployment 38.8 20.3 50.5 
Formal Employment 36.5 45.7 30.7 
Skilled manual work 9.2 12.7 7.0 
Unskilled manual work 7.9 10.2 6.5 
Office work 6.3 8.5 4.8 
Professional 2.6 5.1 1.1 
Domestic work 3.9 2.5 4.8 
Farm work 3.6 3.4 3.8 
Security 1.3 1.7 1.1 
Health work 1.0 0.8 1.1 
Mine work 0.7 0.8 0.5 
Informal Employment 5.3 20.0 3.2 
Other 11.5 9.1 12.4 
Student 9.2 6.8 10.8 
Formal business owner 1.3 0.8 1.6 
Other occupation 1.0 2.5 0.0 
 
Almost all of the in-depth interview respondents recounted how economic hardship, 
unemployment and the difficulty of making ends meet prompted the move to South Africa. One 
mentioned all of these drivers of migration but suggested there were significant ‘pull’ factors at 
work as well, including the assistance of relatives already in South Africa and the prospect of 
employment: 
 
“I used to work at ZimPlats [a mining company] in Zimbabwe. The main reason why I 
came here was because of inflation. The money in Zimbabwe was not buying anything 
and life was tough. There was a rumour that stadiums had to be built for 2010 [for the 
World Cup] so my aunt thought I would get a job opportunity. I already had a passport but 
getting money for the visa was a problem because it was ZAR 2,000 [138 EUR] and that 
was expensive given the financial crisis we had in Zimbabwe. So my aunt had to borrow 
ZAR 1,500 [103 EUR] from a loan shark and my brother hustled another ZAR 700 [48 
EUR] for the visa. The problem was that there was inflation and the Zimbabwean dollar 
had lost power, it was not buying anything anymore. The money which I was earning was 
equivalent to ZAR 300 [20 EUR] by 2008 and it was not enough. I just had to come here 
to find something that would make me earn better.” (Johannesburg Interview No 3) 
 
In the SAMP survey, as many as one half of the interviewees agreed that social networks (in the 
form of family and friends) in South Africa played a role in their migration decision. 
 
Just over 40% agreed that they had come to South Africa as asylum-seekers or refugees (Figure 
7). This is a potentially confusing question since it is not completely clear whether this referred to 
political persecution in Zimbabwe as a reason for migration. However, there was a marked 
difference between Cape Town (62%) and Johannesburg (31%) which might indicate that 
obtaining an asylum-seeker permit was easier in the former. Only a few of the in-depth 
interviewees referred to political persecution, but those that did also referred to economic 
conditions in Zimbabwe as the reason for migration.  For example, one ex-schoolteacher, now in 
Johannesburg, noted that “it was the politics it was also about working conditions and earning 
peanuts” and continued: 
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“Teachers became the target. Teachers were accused of supporting the opposition.  I 
was not in politics but you cannot avoid politics if you are a teacher. You talk about 
history in class and you are accused of teaching politics. In 2008 things were tough. I was 
accused of being an opposition agent. The youth visited me at school and I was harassed 
and beaten in front of the other teachers and the students. That evening I just decided 
enough was enough.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 2) 
 
Very few (only 5%) of the SAMP survey interviewees were working in the Zimbabwean informal 
economy prior to migrating, although this was more common amongst the Cape Town-based 
migrants (23% versus only 3% in Johannesburg). Many of those who had prior informal sector 
experience had prior experience of being in South Africa through involvement in informal cross-
border trading: 
 
“I used to come here as a trader from the early 2000s. I stopped in 2005 and came here 
to South Africa to live. My business is about making and selling electric jugs and brooms. 
I used to come here and sell them and go back home. There are some reasons why I 
came to stay. One is that the economic situation was getting bad. The country was no 
longer the same. I was selling things and not making much money. I wanted to build a 
house in Zimbabwe and I was failing to do so. The cost of living was high. I had just 
married and things were tough. Then there was the issue of politics. My wife was 
harassed when I was in Johannesburg buying goods. They came and searched our 
house and they found nothing. They wanted evidence that I was a sell-out, but they did 
not find anything. My wife was pregnant so I saw that they could injure her if they came 
back next time. That is when I moved to South Africa.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 4) 
 
In this case, too, economic hardship and political harassment were factors in the decision to 
move to South Africa. This, and other MICIC interviews, as well as the SAMP survey results, 
make it clear that migration from Zimbabwe is also ‘mixed’ in the sense that individuals have a 
mixture of motives for migration, as they responded to the multi-faceted nature of the economic 
and political crisis in Zimbabwe.  
 
There is an official and public perception in South Africa that the country is overrun with ‘illegal 
foreigners’ (in the terminology of the 2002 Immigration Act.) Zimbabweans are viewed as 
particularly guilty of being ‘border jumpers’ and in the country without proper documentation. 
Given that most entrepreneurs operate in public spaces, however, there are considerable risks of 
running a business without documents to present to the police who are constantly on the prowl for 
‘illegal foreigners’ to arrest and deport, to confiscate goods from, or to demand bribes from. One 
strategy adopted by traders without papers is to operate only ‘after hours’. In one part of Cape 
Town, for example, there are very few Zimbabweans on the streets until late in the day. After the 
police have gone home for the day, they open their mobile stores and begin operations. A much 
less risky strategy is to have legal documents to present.  
 
The SAMP survey found that relatively few of the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs did not have papers 
of some sort permitting them to be in the country and even to legally work (Table 13). Just over 
one-third of the migrants had asylum-seeker (Section 22) permits but only 5% had recognised 
refugee status (Section 24 permits).  Both asylum-seekers and refugees have a legal right to 
work and earn. Around a quarter had work permits which the majority would have acquired under 
the Zimbabwe Dispensation Programme (ZDP) in 2010 and 2014. Around 10% of the migrants 
had visitor’s permits which are usually issued for 90 days at a time. Only 15% were 
undocumented and did not have permits to reside and/or work in South Africa. 
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Table 13: Immigration Status of Zimbabwean Entrepreneurs 
  
Total 
% 
Cape Town 
% 
Johannesburg 
% 
Asylum-seeker permit  35.9 43.2 31.2 
Work permit  24.7 17.8 29.0 
Visitor’s permit 9.5 8.5 10.2 
Refugee permit  5.3 8.5 3.2 
Permanent resident 4.6 3.4 5.4 
Undocumented 14.5 16.1 13.4 
Other 2.3 0.8 3.3 
No answer 3.1 1.6 4.3 
 
Given that so few of the Zimbabwean migrants had prior business experience, and so many 
came to South Africa to look for employment, it is important to know whether they moved straight 
into the informal economy or tried to work in the formal sector first. A comparison of the dates of 
migration and business establishment suggests that there is a lag between the two dates (Figure 
8). For example, although three-quarters of the migrant entrepreneurs entered the country before 
2010, only 47% of the businesses were established before that date. This also means that over 
50% of the businesses were established after 2009. The rapid growth in the entry of 
Zimbabweans into informal entrepreneurship could be a factor in the growing hostility against 
foreign migrants in the country.  
 
Figure 8: Comparison of Years of Migration and Business Establishment 
 
 
The related question is what migrants do in the period between arrival and informal business 
start-up. As Table 14 suggests, just over one-quarter had experienced a period of unemployment, 
although with significant inter-city difference (41% in Johannesburg and only 6% in Cape Town). 
As many as 45% had worked in the formal economy with similar numbers and types of 
employment in each city. The other major difference between the two groups was that 33% of 
those in Cape Town had experience in another informal business compared with only 10% in 
Johannesburg. Combining these figures with those for unemployment, we can infer that many 
more migrants in Johannesburg are unemployed for a period (perhaps while looking for work) and 
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then set up a business, while those in Cape Town move more quickly into the informal economy, 
possibly because that was their reason for coming to Cape Town in the first place. 
 
Table 14: Other Occupations in South Africa 
  
Total 
% 
Cape Town 
% 
Johannesburg 
% 
Unemployment 27.6 5.9 41.4 
Formal Employment    
Skilled manual work 6.9 9.3 5.4 
Unskilled manual work 18.1 19.5 17.2 
Office work 2.6 1.7 3.2 
Professional 1.3 1.7 1.1 
Domestic work 10.2 11.0 9.7 
Farm work 2.6 5.1 1.1 
Security 2.6 1.7 3.2 
Health work 0.3 0.8 0.0 
Mine work 0.7 0.8 0.5 
Other Informal Employment 18.8 33.0 9.6 
Other    
Student 2.6 0.8 3.8 
Formal business owner 1.3 0.0 1.3 
Other occupation 3.6 6.8 1.6 
 
5.3. Business Ownership and Expansion 
 
The majority of the  Zimbabwean migrant enterprises interviewed in the 2015 SAMP survey were 
in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing, with slight 
differences between the two cities (Figure 9).  Migrants and refugees face severe obstacles in 
accessing loans from formal sources in South Africa as they require collateral.
117
 Just over three-
quarters of the migrants relied on their personal savings to start their businesses (Table 15). 
There was slightly greater reliance on personal savings by entrepreneurs in Johannesburg (87%) 
than Cape Town (64%). More Zimbabwean migrants in Cape Town appear to be able to access 
funds from relatives and non-relatives. 
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 Peberdy, S. (2016). International Migrants in South Africa’s Informal Economy. SAMP Migration Policy 
Series No. 71, Cape Town; Tawodzera, G., Chikanda, A., Crush, J and Tengeh, R. (2015). International 
Migrants and Refugees in Cape Town’s Informal Economy. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 70, Cape 
Town and Waterloo. 
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Figure 9: Sectoral Breakdown of Zimbabwean Migrant Businesses 
 
Table 15: Primary Sources of Start-Up Capital 
  
Total  
% 
Cape Town 
% 
Johannesburg 
% 
Personal savings 78.0 64.4 86.6 
Loan from relatives 9.2 13.6 6.5 
Loan from non-relatives  6.6 15.3 1.1 
Money lenders  2.0 1.7 2.2 
Loan from informal financial institutions 2.0 1.7 2.2 
Business credit (goods on terms)  0.7 0.0 1.1 
Loan from micro-finance institution  0.3 0.8 0.0 
Other source of capital 1.3 2.5 0.5 
 
The majority of the businesses began with very little start-up capital (with 71% in Cape Town and 
62% in Johannesburg having less than ZAR 5,000 (346 EUR)). Rather than being struggling 
survivalists on the margins of the informal economy, however, the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs 
have been relatively successful in their business operations as measured by (a) business 
profitability and (b) enterprise growth. In terms of profitability, the survey interviewees estimated 
their average profits at around ZAR 4,000 (276 EUR) per month. The average in Cape Town 
(ZAR 4,166 (288 EUR) per month) was slightly more than in Johannesburg (ZAR 4,045 (280 EUR) 
per month), although there are more low-profit enterprises in Johannesburg (with 27% earning 
less than ZAR 1,000 (69 EUR) per month compared to only 4% in Cape Town) (Figure 10).  
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Figure 10: Monthly Profit from Business Activities 
 
 
To measure business growth, we compared the start-up capital with the current value of the 
business. In both cities, there appears to have been significant growth. In the case of the Cape 
Town entrepreneurs, for example, 71% had less than ZAR 5,000 (346 EUR) in start-up capital but 
only 23% valued their enterprise at less than ZAR 5,000 (346 EUR) in mid-2015 (Figure 11). In 
Johannesburg, the equivalent figures were 62% and 33% (Figure 12). At the other end of the 
spectrum, while only 2% of the Cape Town entrepreneurs had start-up capital in excess of ZAR 
20,000 (1,384 EUR), 18% valued their business at more than ZAR 20,000 (1,384 EUR) in mid-
2015.  Similarly, in Johannesburg, the figures were 7% and 27%. 
Figure 11: Start-up Capital and Current Business Value in Cape Town 
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Figure 12: Start-up Capital and Current Business Value in Johannesburg 
 
 
5.4. Remitting to Zimbabwe 
 
Business expansion has occurred despite the prime obligation of the entrepreneurs to support 
family still in crisis-ridden Zimbabwe. Instead of reinvesting all of the business profits into further 
expansion, a portion is therefore diverted into remittance channels to Zimbabwe. Over one-third 
of the entrepreneurs remit funds to Zimbabwe at least once a month and as many as three 
quarters send remittances to Zimbabwe at least once per month and a few times per year (Figure 
13). Only 12% never send remittances. The entrepreneurs remit an average of ZAR 8,473 (586 
EUR) per annum. However, there were significant differences in remitting volume between the 
two cities, with those based in Cape Town sending an average ZAR 10,217 (707 EUR) per 
annum to Zimbabwe compared to an average ZAR 7,326 (501 EUR) per annum for those in 
Johannesburg.  
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Figure 13: Frequency of Sending Remittances to Zimbabwe 
 
 
Although not explicitly canvassed in either the SAMP survey or the MICIC interviews, informal 
Zimbabwean remittance couriers (omalayisha) have established themselves as a major conduit 
for remitting to Zimbabwe.
118
 Informal money operators such as the omalayisha command about 
20% of the market share of remitting by these entrepreneurs (Figure 14). Traditionally, many 
migrants have also taken remittances on their own trips back to Zimbabwe or sent them with 
friends.
119
 However, Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in South Africa cannot afford to return home that 
frequently and other formal channels (especially money-transfer companies) have now entered 
the market.  There is a significant difference between Johannesburg and Cape Town-based 
entrepreneurs with regard to other channels. Probably because of the distances and costs 
involved, those in Cape Town are less likely to take the funds themselves and send them with 
friends or co-workers, and more likely to use the money transfer companies and banks.  
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Figure 14:  Money Transfer Channels Used by Migrant Entrepreneurs  
 
 
Symptomatic of the high levels of food insecurity under crisis conditions in Zimbabwe, most of the 
migrant entrepreneurs send funds for food purchase by the household (Table 16). Other major 
uses including non-food household expenses, school fees, clothing and medical costs. There 
appears to be very little investment of remittances in any kind of productive revenue-generating 
activity in Zimbabwe, a finding consistent with research on remittance usage in general.
120
   
 
Table 16: Reasons for Remitting to Zimbabwe 
 
Total  
 % 
Cape Town  
% 
Johannesburg  
% 
Buy food 77.2 78.7 76.1 
Meet other day to day household expenses 46.4 75.0 27.0 
Pay educational/school fees 44.2 57.4 35.2 
Buy clothes 34.1 41.7 28.9 
Pay medical expenses 23.2 35.2 15.1 
Build, maintain or renovate dwelling 19.9 19.4 20.1 
For special events, e.g. weddings/funerals 18.0 26.9 11.9 
Pay transportation costs 10.1 11.1 9.4 
For savings/investment 7.9 4.6 10.1 
Buy property 6.7 6.5 6.9 
For agricultural inputs/ equipment 6.0 6.5 5.7 
Note: Multiple response question 
 
Several additional insights into the remitting behaviour of Zimbabwean migrant entrepreneurs 
came from the in-depth interviews in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Polokwane: 
 
 The majority of the interviewees said they remit funds regularly to family members still in 
Zimbabwe and that these remittances are critical to their survival; 
 In a few cases, especially where most, or all, of the immediate family members have 
joined the migrant in South Africa, remitting amounts and frequency have tailed off or 
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ceased altogether. This is consistent with a pattern first observed by Crush et al. and 
Makina and Masenge that as migrants become more established in South Africa remitting 
tends to decrease;
121
  
 A number of interviewees mentioned the increasing difficulties of remitting goods – 
including foodstuffs – to Zimbabwe (which is probably related to the Zimbabwean 
government’s new restrictions on imports) and were now mostly sending cash; 
 Running a business in South Africa on a continuous basis means that personal 
conveyance of remittances is not especially common. The omalayisha remain relatively 
popular but a new remittance channel is also making its presence felt. Web-based 
electronic money transfer companies were mentioned by a number of interviewees as the 
easiest way to send funds. The two most used are Mukuru and Ecocash;
122
  
 
The obligation to remit is heightened by the crisis conditions in Zimbabwe but also means less 
capital to reinvest in business expansion in South Africa. As one entrepreneur in Johannesburg 
observed: 
 
“All the money that I get just goes straight to support my children. There is no surplus to 
put in the bank or to save for something big. What makes it even worse is being a single 
mother. When you are husband and wife and you both work, at least you can plan and try 
to save money for bigger things. Right now all I get is waiting to go somewhere; there are 
school fees, rent, uniforms, food, clothing and other necessities. I cannot even save from 
January to December and get something like ZAR 5,000 [346 EUR] to start something 
better.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 1) 
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6. Zimbabweans and the Crisis of Extreme Xenophobia 
 
6.1. Experiencing May 2008 
 
All of the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs interviewed in depth for this project had either witnessed or 
been the victim of xenophobic violence or both. The interviews focused on the experience and 
impact of the xenophobic violence on those running businesses in Cape Town, Johannesburg 
and Polokwane. Many of those interviewed had come to South Africa after the nationwide attacks 
on migrants of May 2008 but none were unaware of it or did not know some of the victims. Those 
who had been in the country at the time lost almost everything they had, but it did not mean a 
permanent return to Zimbabwe. They took refuge in shelters and churches and re-started their 
businesses once the worst of the violence was over. Three accounts in widely separated parts of 
the country (Alexandra Park in Johannesburg, Imizamo Yethu in Cape Town and Mankweng in 
Polokwane) illustrate both the destructive nature of the xenophobic violence and the responses of 
the migrants: 
 
“During the xenophobic attacks of 2008 I was there. My musika [shop] was destroyed. 
People came marching and asking foreigners to leave… They came and destroyed the 
musika. It was made up of cardboard and corrugated iron sheets. They destroyed it. The 
cardboard was burnt and the corrugated sheets were taken and some of them thrown all 
over. I lost a lot of money there. Maybe ZAR 3,000 [207 EUR]. I had a lot of goods and I 
was also selling beans, groundnuts and even matemba [sardines] and fish. I lost everything. 
I was only able to carry a few things and fled. Otherwise they would have killed me as well. 
What could they do? The people that start the violence are the ones that can even kill you. 
Many people died in Alex Park. They died. I actually saw a person who had been stoned to 
death and he was lying there for a day without the police getting him.” (Johannesburg 
Interview No. 13)   
 
“I had just closed my spaza [informal shop] and had not even reached home when I saw 
people singing and getting up here. They were coming from the direction of the police 
station coming uphill. We had already heard of xenophobia and so I knew it was happening 
here. I wanted to go back and get some things from the spaza but I was too late because 
they were moving fast. I just had time to change direction and ended up in Hout Bay there. 
There were other Zimbabweans who had also run away and were there. I joined them and 
we went to Wynberg and stayed there at the police station. There were many of us. Like 
me, most people had nothing because they never had time to go home and get clothes or 
blankets. I called someone in Rosebank and they told us that they were staying at a church, 
a Methodist church there so that is where we went. We spent three weeks there. My spaza 
shop was looted. I never got anything back, not even a single sweet. They took everything 
so I had to start from scratch.” (Cape Town Interview No. 20) 
 
“I was living in Mankweng with two other ladies from Zimbabwe. We were renting a room in 
Zone 2. We had been living there for some time and we knew most of the people there. But 
when xenophobia erupted it was as if we had never lived there. We saw some of the 
people that we knew actually looting things belonging to foreigners. We were confronted by 
a group of young men – and they demanded money otherwise they would kill us. It was like 
a dream. We could not believe it. We were robbed there, close to the road, where everyone 
could see. They just took what they wanted and went away singing. I lost my bag, my 
wallet and my friend also lost everything. I was scared that we could be killed or raped. 
Even now I cannot believe that I survived. We went to the highway, the N1 and hiked to 
Musina and then home to Zimbabwe. I only came back after a month when things had 
calmed down. I stopped doing business for over a month. I had no money to start over. I 
had to borrow some money and it took time to recover. Some of my customers moved with 
my money and I never recovered the money. I had to start from scratch and it was difficult.” 
(Polokwane Interview No. 3) 
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6.2. Narratives of Xenophobic Violence 
 
Most of the respondents interviewed for the study recounted incidents of violence that had 
personally affected them from 2008 onwards. These accounts revealed a number of features 
common to most xenophobic attacks on migrant businesses. First, for the migrant entrepreneurs, 
much of the violence seems to be spontaneous and therefore occurs without warning. They 
therefore have little notice or ability to take evasive action. As one victim of violence in the 
informal settlement of Diepsloot near Johannesburg in 2013 pointed out:  
 
“They just occur haphazardly. We cannot always tell what happens next so it is difficult [to] 
do anything and to think of a way to respond. It just happens when you are least aware of 
the problems that are about to erupt. Sometimes we are caught up with all our wares and 
they are destroyed and stolen and so it is difficult to do anything.” (Johannesburg Interview 
No. 10)  
 
The journalist, Anton Harber’s gritty portrait of Diepsloot paints a picture of a volatile and often 
chaotic informal settlement in which vigilante justice and attacks on foreign-owned businesses 
are common.
123
 In 2008, for example, “they showed no discrimination in targeting men, women 
and children, and destroyed, looted and burnt down their businesses and houses”.
124
 However, 
accounts of the unpredictability of xenophobic violence were also common in other areas.  
 
Second, the perpetrators of the xenophobic violence are often from the same community and 
even personally known to the victims:  
 
“The people that robbed us are in this community and we know them. They are the 
community members here. Some of the people here do not like us foreigners. They 
pretend when you deal with them to like us. But they do not like us.” (Johannesburg 
Interview No. 2)  
 
The fact that migrant entrepreneurs are able to provide goods, including food, at competitive 
prices and offer credit to consumers is clearly insufficient to insulate them. In one low-income 
area of Cape Town, part of Khayelitsha, there is reportedly little violence as long as migrant 
business-owners pay protection money to the powerful local taxi association. In many more areas, 
the interviewees reported that community leaders are either ineffective in dealing with the 
violence or, in some cases, actively foment hostility and instigate attacks. In Diepsloot, some 
migrant traders entered into an agreement with their South African counterparts to keep out any 
new migrants who came and established businesses in the area, in exchange for protection.
125
  
 
Third, looting and robbery of goods by opportunistic criminal elements are a constant element in 
the narratives. As one observed: 
 
“There are hard core thieves who rob people and also jobless people around who are 
now taking advantage of these xenophobic attacks and robbing people to get money 
because they have nothing to do with their lives.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 1)  
 
However, the interviewees consistently maintain that robbery per se was not the prime motive for 
the attacks. As one respondent noted:  
 
“They target shops, the owners as well as the goods inside. They only target foreign 
owned shops. There is more to that [than robbery], they want us to leave their country 
because they hate our businesses here and they say we are finishing their jobs.” 
(Johannesburg Interview No. 3) 
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Others pointed to the fact that South African business owners in the same vicinity are left alone 
during crowd violence, that attacks often involve vicious physical assaults against the person, and 
that they are usually accompanied by strident xenophobic language: 
 
“People were being beaten up and they were dying. A group of South Africans moved 
around this whole squatter camp terrorising all foreigners and they used to move with 
someone who knew where all foreigners stayed. These people moved with knobkerries, 
metal sticks, sjamboks and any sort of weapon you can think of for distraction. If you 
were a foreigner and did not have a passport they would beat you up.” (Johannesburg 
Interview No. 3) 
 
“The violence was there for two days or so and I thought it was over. I went to service a 
car in Heiderveld. When I was coming back I passed through one of my friend’s place 
and he accompanied me half way. When he had gone, and I was in Sisulu Street down 
there, they attacked me with a plank and something like a rubber. They hit me all over 
and even stomped on me. It was xenophobia. They told me that they would kill me and 
that I was a foreigner and not wanted here. I cried and asked for them to leave me and 
they continued. No-one intervened. It was past 8pm and there were still people moving 
about. A few other guys joined in. I was saved by a car that passed, when its lights 
flashed them they ran away. They told me that next time they would kill me.” (Cape Town 
Interview No. 3) 
 
“I was robbed in broad daylight here in Masiphumelele. It was not a real robbery, it was a 
gang just saying foreigners must leave. I was about to park my car when the group of 
men descended on me. They asked for my ID and I did not give them and when I said let 
me go and get it, they pounced on me and started pushing me. My neighbours just 
looked on. I asked what I had done but they were just singing derogatory songs. It was 
pure xenophobia. Most of the locals here joined and wanted to chase me out. Even my 
neighbours were caught up in that chaos and were told to go. You see, when there is a 
small thing that happens, it ends up being that foreigners must be chased away. Is that 
not xenophobia? Many times here I have been insulted only because I am a foreigner. 
You ferry someone’s goods and they pay you little and the next time you want your 
balance they start some story that you are a thief or so on and the others join in. Is that 
not xenophobia? Why do they not do that to South Africans? Why only to foreigners? 
These people have xenophobia in their blood.” (Cape Town Interview No. 13) 
 
Fourth, many of the accounts in all three sites describe how a protest or march about government 
service delivery would quickly disintegrate into mob violence and looting of shops and stores 
owned by migrants. The connection between the two events is not immediately obvious but, 
according to the interviewees, the looting is never indiscriminate but only targets migrants. The 
reason, according to some, is that they become scapegoats for government failure to deliver 
services: 
 
“South Africans are not friendly. They say this is their country and they do what they want 
to us, hurting us. These locals ask services from their government and if they are not 
given them they demonstrate and if their concerns are not heard they put their 
frustrations on foreigners. Most of them are uneducated so they think we are the cause of 
their problem and when they see you in business they think you are taking over their 
business. They target foreigners in business. They start with businesses and sometimes 
when their concerns are not heard they even start attacking those not in business and 
foreigners in their homes.” (Cape Town Interview No. 11) 
 
Fifth, there was some evidence of ‘violent entrepreneurship’ involving attacks orchestrated by 
South African competitors. One Zimbabwean entrepreneur in Polokwane, for example, described 
how he had established a business selling and repairing cell phones. He said that his South 
African competitors reported him to the police for dealing in stolen phones but his records showed 
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that all his transactions were legitimate. According to him they had tried several times to get him 
arrested. The reason? “They even tell me to my face that they want me out of this place because 
I am a foreigner. How can they fail to make business when I as a foreigner is doing well? That is 
their quarrel. Some have even organised thieves to rob me and I have been robbed twice.” 
 
Sixth, xenophobic violence is gender-indiscriminate in that both male and female migrants 
recounted equally harrowing stories. Lefko-Everett has argued that one of the most common 
strategies adopted by Zimbabwean women migrants travelling to South Africa as cross-border 
traders is to travel and stay in groups as a means of protection.
126
 Zimbabwean women living in 
South Africa and selling on the streets are generally unable to benefit from group protection. One 
woman in Johannesburg described her experience and sense of helplessness as follows: 
 
“They were calling me names and some were telling me to go back to Zimbabwe saying I 
would die that night. Some of the foreigners who were there and had been trying to 
support me saw that the situation was getting serious and just disappeared. I lost most of 
my goods that day as people just started taking them. The lady who was selling close to 
me also lost her products as people just took and went. It was terrible. No-one was on 
our side. They just did not care that we were females. They just harassed us. I even 
thought of going back home that day. What sopped me is the thought of going back to 
look at my kids without anything. And there was nothing that I would do in Zimbabwe. 
Here we live with xenophobia every day. We see it happening and there is nothing that 
we can do.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 10) 
 
Seventh, the interviewees had different opinions on whether Zimbabweans were particular targets. 
Most said that all foreign-owned businesses were targeted, not simply Zimbabweans. A number 
commented that the type of business made a difference, with food and grocery shops being 
especially vulnerable. Virtually all agreed on one point, however; the purpose of the attacks was 
not simply to steal certain desirable goods but to clean them out and destroy their business 
premises and operations so that they could not continue to function. There were numerous 
examples of entrepreneurs who had lost all of their stock and also had their premises vandalised 
and wrecked, even when they were operating from containers which are generally considered to 
be the best form of protection: 
 
“They broke and took away everything as if they don’t want one to be in business. If they 
wanted goods only they would have just broke in and took stuff only but they destroyed, 
breaking windows and even removing them and most people are not yet back on their 
feet.” (Cape Town Interview No. 8) 
 
“In 2011, the business was attacked by local people. The shop was attacked by the mob. 
They looted everything and left me with almost nothing. I had goods worth over ZAR 
15,000 [1,038 EUR] in here. Everything except some few bottles of cooking oil and 
cigarettes remained. It almost destroyed my business. I was left with very little. I had not 
saved much so it took me some time to be on my feet again. I had to borrow some 
money from friends because I needed to restock. I cannot afford to stock much as I am 
not sure what happens tomorrow. These days we no longer put everything here. Some of 
the stock is at home so that if the steal here, I will have some of my stock at home to start 
again. I just replenish what is in short supply here.” (Cape Town Interview No. 10) 
 
“We had just brought stuff from Zimbabweans on a Sunday. They were worth about ZAR 
10,000 [692 EUR] and included groundnuts (nyimo), sweet potatoes (mbambaira), 
groundnuts (nzungu), matemba and we had also just stocked the local products. We had 
bought a lot of crates like onions for about ZAR 15,000 [1,038 EUR]. All these products 
were in the container and the container was destroyed. They upended it and spilled all 
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the products that were inside to the ground. Some of the products were burnt, taken and 
we were left with nothing. And because we had just stocked we didn’t have any money at 
home so we had to start all over from scratch.” (Cape Town Interview No. 1) 
 
Given the pervasive view amongst South African politicians that xenophobia does not even exist 
in the country (see below), it is important to ask whether those affected by the violence agree. 
Certainly, the term ‘xenophobia’ itself was used by all the interviewees to describe the 
harassment and physical abuse they experience and some even referred to the widespread 
violence in 2008 and 2015 as ‘the xenophobia’. However, they were also asked if they thought 
South Africans were xenophobic and, if so, why. No-one answered the question in the negative. A 
selection of responses clearly indicates that for Zimbabweans, South Africans are, indeed, the 
“owners of xenophobia”:  
 
“I can say that three quarters of them show their hatred towards us foreign nationals. They 
don’t like us. Xenophobia is a South African thing. It happens more than anywhere in the 
world I think. Everything they do shows it. They do not like us. They speak to us like we are 
not like them. They look down upon us. They are like that whether they are Christians or 
not. The children learn it from their parents. The call us makwerekwere.
127
 Do you know 
even small kids can call you makwerekwere? Is that not xenophobic?” (Johannesburg 
Interview No. 2)  
 
“If you want to see how they hate us, just have a disagreement and they will tell you bad 
things, telling you that you will die. What kind of a person wants to see another person 
dying? Life is sacred, but here in South Africa no one seems to care about that. They 
would rather you die so that they can get what you have. This is the only society where 
people kill each other over very simple disagreements.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 10)   
 
“You can see it almost every day in the train and other places when you pass they call you 
derogatory names like makwerekwere. We can see it every day in our daily life and we live 
with it. It does not only happen to people doing business, but it happens to any foreigner no 
matter whom. If you can’t speak their language, you already are a kwerekwere
128
 and you 
are in trouble.” (Cape Town Interview No. 4) 
 
“There are many things that happen. The way they see us, they see us as if we are lesser 
than them. They say bad things about us, like we are thieves and we are ugly and we do 
not bath, such things. But they know most of these things are not true but they like saying 
them anyway.” (Cape Town Interview No. 10) 
 
“Is there a country in the world where foreigners are killed and burnt like here? No. South 
Africa is a place like no other place. It is a country with people that do not care about other 
people. Look at the way the kill foreigners. The way the chase foreigners and steal their 
goods and injure them. That is not done by normal people. South Africans are xenophobic. 
They do not fear evil spirits from the dead. They just kill and the next hour they are busy 
braaing and singing and eating amagwinya. They are not normal people.” (Cape Town 
Interview No. 12) 
 
The language and practices of xenophobia cow the victims into silence and a sense of 
helplessness, short of returning to Zimbabwe which is not seen as a viable option. As one 
respondent said: “Here we live with xenophobia every day. We see it happening and there is 
nothing that we can do” (Johannesburg Interview No. 10). And another: “I remain silent because I 
am Zimbabwean and I can’t go against what they say. But they have to realise that we are the 
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same we have the same skin as black people but we just keep quiet even as they insult us” 
(Johannesburg Interview No. 12). 
 
6.3. Zimbabwean Migrant Reactions to Xenophobic Violence 
 
The interviews conducted for this project provide important insights into how migrant 
entrepreneurs themselves respond to the threat and reality of xenophobic violence. From the 
responses of some of the migrants, it appears that trying to ‘fit in’ and integrate by learning local 
languages, dress codes and cultural practices is one way to try and pre-empt attacks.
129
 However, 
these strategies were no guarantee of protection when mob violence broke out: 
 
“I was robbed during the day. There was a strike and I was coming from the shops. I was 
not here the previous day and so I did not know that there was a strike. When they saw 
me coming the mob ran to me. I was beaten and robbed. They knew I was a foreigner. I 
can speak three local languages and I spoke in isiZulu but they knew me, some of them 
and they said he is a Zimbabwean and they attacked me. If I was a local I was not going 
to be attacked. I had ZAR 1,800 [124 EUR]. All was taken. That was my money that I had 
collected from my customers. They robbed me because I was a Zimbabwean, a 
foreigner.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 2) 
 
A number of the interviewees argued that unlike some migrant groups, such as Somalis and 
Ethiopians, Zimbabweans were not inclined to band together to form associations or groups to 
lobby for and secure protection for their members. Indeed, some even went so far as to say that 
they had lost goods to fellow Zimbabweans during some attacks. Why else, they reasoned, were 
foodstuffs that only Zimbabweans liked to eat being looted?  
 
A number suggested that there was safety in numbers and that by doing business in areas where 
there were lots of other migrant businesses, the chances of being attacked were considerably 
reduced. One respondent explained the attraction of running a business in the Johannesburg 
CBD as follows: “You will find that incidences of xenophobic attacks are very rare in Joburg 
central where they are a lot of foreigners. Also Park Station is a strategic location which supplies 
the whole of South Africa so our protection as foreigners is better” (Johannesburg Interview No. 
13). The downside of operating in such safer locations was that business competition is extremely 
fierce.   
 
Most were aware that a great deal of the xenophobic violence was confined to low-income areas, 
particularly informal settlements (or ‘locations’ as the Zimbabweans called them). Some of the 
most vicious xenophobic mob violence described by the interviewees occurred in informal 
settlements such as Imizamo Yethu, Dunoon and Masimphumele in Cape Town and Diepsloot 
and Orange Farm in Johannesburg. While it was possible for some to avoid doing business in 
these areas, and operating in areas of the city where attacks were less frequent, this was not a 
feasible option for all. Many Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa do not have the financial 
resources to afford accommodation anywhere other than informal settlements and do not have 
the means to run a business anywhere else.  
 
A number of the interviewees noted that the unpredictability of the attacks made it difficult to ‘plan’ 
in advance. Some said that they made sure that they did not keep all of their stock at the place of 
business, storing some of it at home or in rented containers. All tried to minimise the amount of 
cash they kept on the premises, although not many Zimbabwean entrepreneurs have access to 
formal banking facilities. One noted that as soon as he had made some money, he immediately 
remitted it to Zimbabwe “so that even if I am attacked, there is nothing much that they can take 
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from me. It is better if my family can have that money” (Polokwane Interview No. 6). Another said 
that he was planning to relocate once he had sufficient capital saved up: 
 
“Surely experience is the best teacher but I think you plan when you have money, so I am 
thinking of saving a lot of money and looking for safer business locations like in town. I 
am thinking so because in 2008 they also attacked my business. They just broke and 
took away all my stuff, now they have burnt the structure down. So I re-constructed and 
started again so I am now thinking how I am to keep myself and my stuff safe.” (Cape 
Town Interview No. 15) 
 
Various reactive strategies were mentioned when their businesses were attacked. These included 
temporarily ceasing business operations, staying indoors at home, and moving to stay with 
friends or relatives in other parts of the city “until the dust settled” as one put it.  Others said that 
the best strategy was simply to flee the area (or as one graphically put it “you run with your life”), 
if possible taking some valuable item with them which they could later sell and restart the 
business. None of the interviewees said that xenophobic attacks would put them permanently out 
of business. On the contrary, most said they would simply raise the capital and start up again. 
 
The logical implication of the determination to stay in business is that xenophobic violence has 
failed in its two main aims: to drive migrant entrepreneurs out of business and to drive them out of 
the country and back to Zimbabwe. The interviewees were asked if they would return to 
Zimbabwe as a result of xenophobic attacks and the general consensus was that they would not. 
A significant number noted that they had settled in South Africa with their families and did not 
want to return. Many more made reference to the fact that the crisis in Zimbabwe meant that 
there was nothing for them to return to, even if they wished to do so: 
 
“There is nothing in Zimbabwe. I am not going back. I am trying to make my life here. My 
wife is here and my child is here. I am not going back there. Zimbabwe is a country I love. 
It’s just that at the moment things are tough and there is really nothing to do when you 
return back home.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 11) 
 
“While the hardships which I face in South Africa are many they are still better than the 
hardships I endured back in Zimbabwe. In the event of future attacks, I could try and 
survive because at least I will be doing something.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 13) 
 
“I could never go back because there are no means of surviving. I could simply have to 
look for an alternative way to survive while in South Africa. Even if they attack me I will 
look for another means to survive as long as I am not dead.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 
19) 
 
“I am not going back. There is nothing to do in Zimbabwe especially because we left a 
long time ago. What will we do there? So we stay here because this is where our life is. 
We are establishing here and so if you leave you have to start again. I am not going back. 
When xenophobia starts we simply move to areas that are safe and return when it is 
quiet.” (Cape Town Interview No. 7) 
 
Particularly relevant to this project is the impact of xenophobic violence on remitting behaviour. 
Here there is a clear difference between Zimbabweans in wage employment and those running 
businesses in the informal economy. The former are assured of a reasonably regular income 
stream whereas the latter are not. Earnings are unpredictable and there are significant additional 
operational costs (including payment of rent for business properties, transportation of goods for 
sale, and transactional payments, such as bribes demanded by the police). All of these factors 
mean that informal entrepreneurs tend to remit on an irregular basis and in varying amounts. 
However, they (and their families in Zimbabwe) are particularly vulnerable to income and 
remittance interruptions resulting from xenophobic violence. All of the interviewees whose 
businesses had been victims of xenophobic violence were very clear about its negative impact on 
their ability to remit and, by extension, on their family members in Zimbabwe. As one noted 
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“obviously you will send less money home.” The specific impacts on family in Zimbabwe were 
enumerated by others: 
 
“They wouldn’t be able to eat or pay for school fees, so they can’t survive if I don’t send.” 
(Johannesburg Interview No. 19) 
 
“When people steal your property and prevent you from working, then the money you send is 
reduced. The guy who refused to pay me affected me a lot. I could not send my mother 
money for four months and it bothered me because my mother and sister want to eat.” (Cape 
Town Interview No. 3) 
 
“Xenophobia reduces the money I send. I had to save for some time to be able to send them 
after the container was vandalised. If I stopped sending money they would starve. They do 
not have another source of money. I am the one looking after them. I do everything I can to 
make sure that they are okay.” (Cape Town Interview No. 9) 
 
“When these attacks happen, they (relatives in Zimbabwe) are affected, especially when they 
hear about these incidents. They will be worried about how we are surviving, that’s why they 
keep phoning asking how things are because they will be having no source of income but we 
tell them things are not okay and we are not going to do business. Like the last incident we 
spent a week not going to work to do business. There was no transport and if you were seen 
going to do business you were attacked and killed.” (Cape Town Interview No. 11) 
 
“We give (money) and pay people going home to go and give it to our relatives. Maybe once 
or twice a month since children are going to school. But since the shop was burnt down it’s 
been difficult to send money back home. Even myself I am struggling to survive even to pay 
rent.” (Cape Town Interview No. 15) 
 
“I have to keep sending money and goods. That is why I am here. They cannot do well 
without that money. I stopped remitting (during the xenophobic violence) because I had to go 
back home. I went back without anything because it was not a planned return. So we had 
problems but I returned as soon as the problem was over and people were getting back to the 
communities.” (Polokwane Interview No. 3) 
 
What these responses indicate is a lesson of broader importance for the study of migrants in 
countries in crisis. Migrants caught up in a crisis in a country of destination do not always have 
the option of returning to their home country. In the case of Zimbabweans in South Africa, return 
is certainly physically possible but the migrants are making a different kind of calculation. 
Zimbabwean migrants who encounter xenophobic violence in South Africa are forced to navigate 
two crises in their sending and receiving countries simultaneously. Xenophobic violence creates a 
double bind for affected migrants, who were confronted with two equally undesirable courses of 
action. That is, go back to the economic freefall and political repression in Zimbabwe or continue 
to face the constant risks of violence and discrimination by remaining in South Africa. If return 
migration poses a cleft-stick for most migrants, those who have additionally faced persecution for 
their political activities against the Zimbabwean regime are even less inclined to leave the relative 
security of South Africa, even if it exposes them to other forms of violence. This reality has very 
concrete implications for how both governments, as well as other stakeholders, might best 
respond to the crisis.   
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7. Stakeholder Responses to Xenophobic Violence 
 
This section of the report examines governmental and non-governmental responses to the crisis 
of xenophobia in South Africa. Three caveats are necessary. First, the discussion of the response 
of some stakeholders is necessarily focused on responses to xenophobia and xenophobic 
violence in general. Although these interventions may impact upon and benefit Zimbabwean 
migrants, they are not specifically designed to benefit them. Second, where responses are 
directed at Zimbabwean migrants, they rarely single out migrant entrepreneurs as a sub-category 
although, again, the interventions may impact upon and benefit them. Third, few if any of the 
migrants interviewed for this study reported receiving assistance from any of the stakeholders. 
They are extremely critical of the perceived inaction of both the Zimbabwean and South African 
governments and reported little if any contact with or help from non-governmental organisations 
during or following episodes of xenophobic violence. 
 
7.1. Migrant Perceptions of Government (In)action 
 
Building on the discussion in the previous sections of the report, it is first important to understand 
the experience and perspective of the migrant entrepreneurs. All were therefore asked about the 
response of the South African and Zimbabwean governments to xenophobic violence against 
Zimbabweans. The responses ranged from the outright cynical to the totally dismissive. Not a 
single respondent said they had been helped by either government and none were prepared to 
defend the response of either to xenophobic violence in general. Most were extremely critical of 
both. The general consensus was not that the governments did not do enough but rather that 
they did nothing at all.  
 
In the case of the Zimbabwean government, the prevailing sentiment was captured by one 
Johannesburg respondent who said:  
 
“The Zimbabwean government does nothing. I have never heard them comment or say 
anything about these attacks. They do not help us at all. They do not send anyone to 
come and see how we are living and even provide us with assistance. There is no 
government that helps us.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 2) 
 
Explanations for why the government ‘does nothing’ ranged from sheer disinterest in what 
happened to Zimbabweans outside the country, a lack of resources to do anything to help, and a 
desire to see Zimbabweans return home instead of staying in South Africa.  
 
Far harsher criticism was reserved for the South African government’s practice of ‘doing nothing’: 
 
“The South African government does not do anything. At least nothing that I know of. 
They are just silent. We just see the police, but they come too late and do not do anything. 
They do not arrest anyone even though you report. They are just moving about, but really 
doing nothing. I sometimes think that even the police hate us the foreigners. Would they 
do the same and not help if foreigners attack local people? No, they would arrest us. So 
the police do not help us and would rather see us gone. Even the community leaders do 
not do anything.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 2) 
 
“Some of the people in government are fuelling xenophobia. They are also xenophobic 
because they say a lot of things that are not true. Like we are the ones who are causing 
problems here. They had problems here before we came. They are very corrupt but they 
are the ones that tell people that foreigners are the cause of the problems. People listen 
to the government. They keep saying that foreigners are bad. What do you expect the 
people to do? The people follow their government.” (Cape Town Interview No. 5) 
 
“They are the ones that cause it so they do not care. The one that occurred in Durban it 
was the King who incited people. Now he is saying he did not do it but we all saw him on 
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TV. The government does not care for us. They care about their people only. If it were 
foreigners doing violence against the locals, we would all be in jail.” (Cape Town 
Interview No. 6) 
 
Even those who did not label the government’s reaction as xenophobic itself, felt that xenophobic 
violence was tolerated because it supposedly achieved the desired effect of getting ‘foreigners’ to 
leave the country. 
 
7.2. Response of Zimbabwean Government  
 
How accurate are these criticisms of inaction articulated by the victims of xenophobic violence? In 
the case of Zimbabwe, the fragilities of the sending state, the consequent inability to leverage 
improved protection for its citizens in South Africa, and the conditions that produce large flows of 
migrants and exposes them to such dangerous circumstances, are all critical determinants of the 
response or lack thereof. Fragile states like Zimbabwe certainly possess very limited capacity and 
resources to provide help and support to their citizens, when such situations arise. However, as 
Koser argues, the Zimbabwean state seems to lack the political will to assist its citizens when 
they have been stricken by emergencies in other countries.
130
  
 
In May 2008, the Zimbabwean consulate in Johannesburg indicated that the government was 
organising voluntary repatriations. The time lag between the onset of emergency situations and 
the establishments of consular assistance was also defended. The Zimbabwean government 
eventually sent two trucks and ten buses to South Africa to transport those who wanted to be 
repatriated.
131
 But, it is not known what other help this cash-strapped state provided to these 
victims and how many of those who left remained in South Africa and for how long.  
 
In 2015, six buses and a truck were sent to South Africa to repatriate Zimbabweans who wished 
to leave and a total of 407 people, including women and children, returned to Zimbabwe. One 
man described his reason for returning as follows: 
“I watched my cousin being beheaded by a group of rowdy Zulus armed with machetes, 
knives, knobkerries and guns who were toyi-toying, singing songs denouncing foreigners. 
It seemed that the South African Police were laughing while my relative was being killed. 
We were only helped by the Metro Police who took us to a camp where other 
Zimbabweans were. As a result, I left my wife whose life I do not fear for as she is South 
African. I fear for the lives of my children because these people were ruthless.”
132
 
While some traumatised migrants said they would never return to South Africa, most had little 
choice, as there were few livelihood opportunities for them in Zimbabwe. 
 
The Zimbabwean government equivocated in its public response to the xenophobic violence of 
early 2015. When news of the attacks first broke, President Mugabe was actually on his first state 
visit to South Africa with a business delegation, but he avoided publicly commenting on the 
violence. Instead, playing to his hosts, he thanked South Africa for its hospitality and patience 
towards those migrating without valid visas: “Naturally, that must be resolved, people moving 
without passports into South Africa…We must find ways of controlling movement which is not 
sanctioned”.
133
 An official statement released by the South African government about the visit 
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reiterated Mugabe’s remarks on Zimbabwean ‘border-jumpers’ and went on to decry the 
“thousands of Zimbabwean economic migrants” residing in the country.
134
  
 
Later, the Zimbabwean government strongly condemned the violence. In a formal address in 
Harare to mark the country’s 35
th
 independence anniversary, Mugabe expressed “shock and 
disgust” at the xenophobic violence in KwaZulu-Natal and other locations in South Africa, and 
calling for its immediate end: “The act of treating other Africans in that horrible way can never be 
condoned by anyone. Our own African people on the African continent must be treated with 
respect”.
135
 In an interview with the BBC, Information Minister Jonathan Moyo urged the South 
African government to condemn the violence: “If you allow that [xenophobic violence] to happen 
without condemning it outright, without condemning it unconditionally, you sow the seeds of 
genocide”.
136
 However, after attending a summit of SADC leaders, President Mugabe reverted to 
criticising migrants, reportedly noting that “people must go back to their own country. We, the 
neighbours, should do whatever we can to prevent more people from going into South Africa and 
get those who are in South Africa to get back home”.
137
 
  
In sum, the Zimbabwean government can be prodded into making critical statements about 
xenophobic violence in South Africa, and providing some transportation for those who wish to 
voluntarily return to Zimbabwe in moments of extreme crisis, as in May 2008 and January 2015. 
However, little appears to have been said or done in the intervening years between 2008 and 
2015 (or since) about ongoing xenophobic violence directed at Zimbabwean citizens and migrant 
entrepreneurs in South Africa. Until recently, the Zimbabwean government viewed migrants who 
had left the country very negatively and saw migration almost as a traitorous act. Harsh criticism 
was often reserved for the many Zimbabweans in the diaspora, including in South Africa, despite 
their central role in propping up the economy with remittances. This negative attitude has 
certainly softened in the last year as the government devised a National Diaspora Policy which 
was approved by Cabinet in June 2016.
138
 Whether this extends to an active concern with how 
Zimbabweans are being treated in other countries remains to be seen.  
 
7.3. Response of South African Government  
 
7.3.1. Responses to May 2008 
 
A South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) investigation of the events of May 2008 
argued that there had been little intervention by various levels of government in incidents of 
xenophobic violence before 2008.
139
 Local police had a poor record of protecting migrants when 
they were being attacked and negligible attention was paid to localised conflicts between locals 
and non-citizens. Indeed, the situation had been allowed to escalate unchecked into a full-blown 
crisis in May 2008. When the violence first unfolded, the South African government initially 
ignored the situation and downplayed its significance.
140
  By the end of May, however, 
government could no longer disregard the very large number of displaced persons and the 
mounting international criticism and negative publicity about its handling of the crisis. The army 
was called in to quell the attacks and a state of emergency was declared.
141
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Subsequent studies of the responses of the South African government to the violence of 2008 
highlight the many weaknesses in the governance of xenophobic violence and the emergency 
management of displaced persons.
142
 As Everatt notes: “civil society organisations stepped into 
the space created by government’s initial indecisiveness regarding the causes, nature and 
appropriate way to respond to the conflagration”.
143
 The spontaneous mobilisation of civil society 
organisations included anti-xenophobia marches in major cities and humanitarian assistance to 
the displaced: 
 
“When the violence struck, civil society organisations accessed and channelled resources, 
provided food, shelter and other material assistance. Civil society mobilized hundreds of 
people as volunteers. It pressurised government to intervene…. Many of the civil society 
organisations working on the response had never worked together before. The civil 
society response was diverse and plural in nature. It included NGOs, social movements, 
community-based organisations (CBOs), civics, schools, women’s groups, peace and 
justice organisations, academics, students, Christian, Jewish and Muslim faith-based 
organisations (FBOs), refugee and migrant organisations, school governing bodies, 
community policing forums, professional associations and trade unions. These diverse 
groupings were brought together under several umbrellas which served different 
purposes, from humanitarian aid to political activism. These organisations also put 
pressure on political parties and constitutional institutions to intervene.”
144
  
 
In the displacement camps, NGOs provided services, psychological support, legal assistance, 
education and advocacy, and lobbied to ensure standards of care. Civil society also mounted 
legal challenges, including an attempt to prevent the closure of the camps.  The legal action was 
successful but was ignored by the state. One of the outcomes of civil society mobilisation was the 
formation of new coalitions of organisations including the Durban Action Against Xenophobia 
(DAAX), the Coalition Against Xenophobia, Racism, Ethnicism and Poverty (CAXREP), the 
Coalition Against Xenophobia in Johannesburg, and the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) in Cape 
Town.    
 
In the months following May 2008, however, the momentum was quickly lost, which suggests that 
civil society was quick to mobilise with humanitarian actions but slow to devise an effective and 
ongoing responses to less dramatic but continuing acts of xenophobic violence.
145
 As a review of 
the civil society response later noted, “the civil society response was an effective short-term 
humanitarian intervention. After the immediacy of the crisis passed, the momentum created by 
the crisis was lost”.
146
 
 
Although the South African government had some previous experience of dealing with large-scale 
displacement caused by disasters such as floods, it had not handled such an emergency 
involving attacks by its own citizens on non-citizens.
147
 There was confusion over which 
government department was responsible, especially since the mandate of the Department of 
Home Affairs does not include welfare provisions required in emergency assistance.
148
 Strict 
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border management, which has been a cornerstone of immigration governance of the post-
apartheid state, continued during this volatile period, resulting in the forced deportation of some 
violence-affected, displaced persons. Two months elapsed before the deportation of affected 
migrants was halted. 
 
Some have suggested that the attacks were not really xenophobic because South Africans were 
equally at risk since and were amongst the fatalities. This view plays into a broader discourse 
which suggests that migrant enterprises are no more at risk than their South African 
counterparts.
149
 In May 2008, South African victims were probably cases of mistaken identity or 
revenge attacks on South Africans who had rented property to migrants. There were certainly few 
South Africans amongst the 100,000 displaced people who took shelter in makeshift camps 
around the country. There was strong concern among non-governmental actors that the quality of 
aid to the displaced migrants was inadequate and far below the prescribed minimum international 
standard for disasters.
150
 In a public statement, MSF noted that “after living in unacceptable 
conditions for up to three weeks, the displaced people are now being relocated by the South 
African government, without proper access to information about their rights and options, to sites 
that are unprepared and insecure. They say they are being treated like animals”.
151
 Camps 
around the country for the displaced were closed by provincial governments in late 2008, 
generating considerable controversy and opposition from migrants and human rights 
organisations.
152
 
 
Critics of the South African government’s response to xenophobic violence tend to focus on the 
ineffectiveness of its interventions: 
 
“Systemic and deeply entrenched xenophobic attitudes and behavior in South Africa are 
clear evidence that responses and interventions designed to address the problem have 
been largely ineffective. National government and relevant local authorities have thus far 
either tended to ignore the problem or to categorise violence against foreign nationals 
and other forms of xenophobic behavior as part of ‘normal’ crime with no need for 
additional targeted interventions.”
153
 
 
Although the South African government moved more swiftly in response to the escalating 
xenophobic violence in early 2015, other lessons from May 2008 remained unaddressed. A 
Counter-Xenophobia Unit (CXU) had been set up by the Department of Home Affairs in 2004 and 
conducted some sporadic activities. In 2007 and 2008, for example, it reportedly investigated the 
causes of xenophobia-related violence in several parts of the country and concluded that “the 
major sources of violence were identified as lack of service delivery, unemployment, poverty, 
competition for business and crime”.
154
 Ironically, given the name and mission of the CXU, no 
mention was made of xenophobia itself. The CXU was eventually disbanded. The many 
recommendations of the South African Human Rights Commission to different levels and 
departments for tackling xenophobia in the aftermath of May 2008 were largely ignored.
155
  
 
7.3.2. Responses to 2015 Attacks 
 
After the xenophobic violence broke out in early 2015, the highest levels of the South African 
government initially became involved. A Press Release dated 19 April 2015 condemned the 
“callous acts of violent attacks and looting that have been witnessed in the past week, particularly 
                                                 
149
 Charman, A. and Piper, L. (2012); Piper, L. and Charman, A. (2016). Xenophobia, Price Competition and 
Violence in the Spaza Sector in South Africa. African Human Mobility Review 2: 332-361. 
150
 Peberdy, S. and Jara, M. (2011). 
151
 MSF (2 June, 2008). Relocation Process Exacerbates Trauma of Displaced People in South Africa. MSF 
Website. Retrieved from: http://www.msf.org/en/article/relocation-process-exacerbates-trauma-displaced-
people-south-africa.  
152
 SAHRC (2010), p.58-64.  
153
 Misago, J-P., Freemantle, I. and Landau, L. (2015), p.25.  
154
 DHA (2008). Annual Report for 2007-8: Building the New Home Affairs. Pretoria. 
155
 SAHRC (2010).  
 54 
in KwaZuluNatal and recently in Gauteng” and unequivocally condemned “the maiming and killing 
of our brothers and sisters from other parts of the continent. No amount of frustration or anger 
can justify these attacks and looting of shops”.
156
 Amongst the ‘critical interventions’ listed in the 
release were the following: 
 
 Law enforcement agencies were doing “whatever it takes to restore law and order within 
our communities.” 
 President Jacob Zuma had cancelled a visit to Indonesia and personally visited 
“displaced foreign nationals” in Durban “to assure them of our support as government of 
South Africa” and “spread the message of peace and tolerance.” 
 Zuma would lead a stakeholder outreach programme around the country to engage 
communities. 
 Attacks on any fellow human beings and destruction of property as well as looting are 
criminal offences and would not be tolerated.  
 Meetings would be held with church leaders to appeal to them to preach a message of 
peace and to ask their followers not to take part in violence. 
 Meetings of government ministers with representatives of the African diplomatic 
community were being held “to assure them of our commitment to ensure peaceful co-
existence between South African citizens and people from other African nations who live 
in South Africa.” 
 The Department of Social Development was providing food, shelter and other necessities 
to displaced persons in shelters in both Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. Trauma counselling 
and debriefing services were being provided to individuals on site at the shelters.  
 Government was working closely with civil society to provide all possible support to the 
displaced as they await reintegration back into their communities. 
 Law enforcement officers were “working very hard” to ensure that those involved in acts 
of violence were arrested, charged and convicted. A total of 307 suspects had been 
arrested “in connection with attacks on foreigners and public violence across the 
country.” 
 Condemnation of those using social media “to instil fear in different parts of the country” 
by sending fictitious SMS and WhatsApp messages warning people of imminent attacks.  
 The National Joint Operational Centre (NATJOC) was operating on a 24-hour basis to 
coordinate the government-wide response to this situation. Provincial Joint Operational 
Structures (PROVJOCS) had been activated to monitor and curb any potential threats 
across the nine provinces of the country.  
 A stern warning was issued “to those who lend themselves to acts of public violence. We 
will find you and you will be dealt with to the full might of the law. You will be arrested and 
sentenced accordingly. We warn especially young people as having a criminal record can 
disrupt their lives. We urge people with information on plans to cause violence or those 
who have witnessed acts of violence, to contact one of the operational centres, either in 
the relevant province or at national level.” 
There was no explicit mention of xenophobia at all in the official release. Instead there was an 
assurance that “the overwhelming majority of South Africans are against the violent attacks 
against our brother and sisters from other African countries” and it did say that government 
“would address some of the issues that have been raised by communities.” In the weeks that 
followed, it became clear that the communities referred to were all South Africans and that the 
‘issues’ referred to were those raised by South Africans. 
While the South African government had improved its management of xenophobic violence, it still 
relied on a largely reactive strategy. Voluntary return was encouraged as the desirable course of 
action by authorities in both 2008 and 2015. Unprepared to deal with an emergency situation on 
this scale in 2008, South African authorities actively supported migrants’ decision to leave South 
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Africa and facilitated their departure.
157
 After the violence of 2015, affected migrants without valid 
status were asked to repatriate “voluntarily” to their country of origin as a condition for receiving 
assistance at the temporary camps.
158
 According to the SRG, the emphasis on voluntary 
repatriation as an effective strategy to deal with displaced migrants runs the danger of conveying 
the impression that “it is acceptable to attack migrants” as the “government will make sure that 
they are assisted to leave South Africa”.
159
 
 
The major response to the 2015 violence was the establishment of an Inter-Ministerial Committee 
on Migration (IMC) housed in the Presidency, and on which 15 government ministers sat. The 
brief of the IMC was “to promote orderly and efficient migration and peaceful co-existence 
between citizens and non-South Africans, as well as to consider social, economic and security 
aspects of migration”.
160
 An Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee was also constituted by both 
houses of parliament with the mandate to investigate the causes of the violence.
161
 The IMC 
made its own findings known to the Ad Hoc Committee in a public briefing. According to the IMC: 
 
 The primary cause of the violence against foreign nationals was “increased competition 
arising from the socio-economic circumstances in South Africa.” According to the IMC, 
statistics showed “a growth in the number of unskilled immigrants entering the country 
since 2008 … in the context of slowing economic growth and a decline in unskilled job 
creation.”  
 Competition had been heightened by “a decade of poor implementation of immigration 
and border controls” and that “if the underlying causes are not addressed there remained 
a considerable latent potential for resurgence of violent anti-foreign national sentiments.” 
 The total number of migrants in the country was between five million and six million. It 
was thus “highly likely” that immigrants represented more than 10% of the country's 
population. 
 The reasons for increasing migration included “South Africa's relatively successful 
economy; abuse of the asylum seeker and permit waivers systems; corruption in the 
border environment and failed border coordination.” 
 Foreign nationals were placing a strain on government services such as health, housing, 
education and social grants.  
 Foreign nationals were “dominating trade in certain sectors such as consumable goods in 
informal settlements which has had a negative impact on unemployed and low skilled 
South Africans.” 
 Challenges with the migration policy of the country included: that “no reservations were 
made to international agreements unlike other countries” [sic]; that asylum seekers were 
allowed to work; and “there being no provision to share the burdens of migration with 
other African countries.” 
 Plans included “revisiting South Africa's unreserved accession to relevant UN 
conventions and the related changes to the Refugees Act (No. 130 of 1998); measures to 
track and trace those persons who had overstayed the allowed time on their permits; 
decentralising Refuge Reception Centres at ports of entry to ensure “more restricted 
movement for rapid and controlled processing of applications” and improvement of 
borderline management “in terms of expedited construction and repair of border fences 
and increased patrols.” 
 
These unsubstantiated ‘findings’ – exaggerating the numbers of migrants in the country and 
essentially blaming the violence on migrants and the poor enforcement of migration policy – were 
compounded by the Minister’s observation at a press conference that “as the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee, we've concluded that South Africans are not xenophobic”.
162
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The Committee concluded that “the main causes of the violent attacks were criminal actions that 
started with stealing of goods from foreign owned spaza shops by South African criminals who 
are often drug addicts. The spaza shop owners would react by shooting at those who steal from 
their spaza shops using unregistered firearms rather than reporting to the police. When this 
happens and someone is killed, local communities retaliate by looting spaza shops owned by 
foreign nationals rather than reporting to the police”.
163
 
 
7.3.3. Operation Fiela 
 
Government has the resources to implement its vision of what should be done and gave effect to 
this in the form of the so-called Operation Fiela-Reclaim, launched by the IMC, in April 2015 in 
the wake of the violence. Operation Fiela was described on the government website as “a 
multidisciplinary interdepartmental operation aimed at eliminating criminality and general 
lawlessness from our communities. As the word ‘Fiela’ means to sweep clean, we are ridding 
communities of crime and criminals so that the people of South Africa can be and feel safe. The 
ultimate objective of the operation is to create a safe and secure environment for all in South 
Africa” (Government updates on Operation Fiela were posted online).
164
 
 
In practice, a critical component of Operation Fiela was a massive drive to harass migrant-owned 
businesses, locate undocumented migrants and facilitate their deportation.
165
 By the end of 2015, 
government could boast that Operation Fiela had searched 460,000 people, 151,000 vehicles 
and 38,000 premises. A total of 41,000 arrests had also been made. Many of these were 
migrants. The breakdown was not given but earlier, in July 2015, the largest number of arrests 
were migrants, followed by persons arrested for drug possession.
166
 Between April and June of 
2015, 10,242 migrants were deported, of which Zimbabweans constituted the second largest 
group (3,051 migrants) after Mozambicans (3,691 persons).
167
 The absence of due process in the 
militaristic implementation of Operation Fiela led Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) to 
(unsuccessfully) challenge the constitutionality of the way in which the Operation was being 
conducted in the North Gauteng High Court in June 2015. An application for leave to appeal to 
the Constitutional Court was dismissed in December 2016. In the interview with Lawyers for 
Human Rights for this study, they reiterated their concerns: 
 
“What we found astonishing was the Operation Fiela response from government. They 
said the appropriate response (to xenophobia) is multi-agency enforcement to identify 
and address and detain and deport undocumented migrants and the justification was that 
South Africans are concerned about large numbers of undocumented migrants and 
involvement in crime and threats to social cohesion. So the best way to address the issue 
was to remove them.  It emphasised the growing securitisation of migration – the 
language they used was national security language and moved away from rights 
language.”  
  
What quickly became clear was that a particular target of Operation Fiela was the informal 
economy and businesses owned by migrant entrepreneurs. In Cape Town, for example, just 
before the global celebration of World Refugee Day, the police, army, traffic officials, and 
immigration officials descended en masse on Cape Town’s Station deck (a taxi terminus and 
market above Cape Town railway station). They closed the Deck for four hours and raided all the 
stalls. Various informal traders described what transpired: 
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“Yesterday was a big loss. We had prepared food that could not be delivered to our 
customers as usual. No one was allowed to come in or out of the deck. Soldiers and 
police had blocked all entrances and exit points. I have not yet paid my workers … Since 
I started this business (selling pap and mutton stew) in 2010, I never let my workers down 
when it comes to paying wages. When police got into my neighbour’s stall, they did not 
find anything illegal. I am not sure why she was arrested.”
168
  
 
“There was police, army and immigration. They were looking for those people who live in 
South Africa without documents. They asked me for my document: I take my passport 
and showed them, and they left. I’ve been here for five years already. Nothing like this 
has happened to me. Most of the people didn’t have their documents, and there was 
nowhere to run – it was all over the place. I saw they arrested a woman, but she was 
back here yesterday. She didn’t have her document on Saturday, but she maybe asked 
her kids to bring it to the police so she could be released. The police are not wrong, 
because you can’t live in a country without documents. But the army thing, I don’t 
understand why they are here. They carry those guns like it’s war here. If you come to 
search the people like that, it’s not good, because even today some shops didn’t open 
because the people were worried about that.”
169
 
“It was really terrifying the manner in which they did [things] yesterday. Soldiers pointed 
guns, ready to shoot anyone [who was] against what was happening. I was selling some 
brand stuff, but these people went beyond that. Some of them were wicked. I could 
neither question their authority nor do anything to stop them from taking my stuff. They 
came in and took down all my stuff. They confiscated almost 50 items [including] jeans, 
trousers and tops. Out of these items, less than ten were brand names. Yesterday was a 
great loss, since the operation went into our busiest time of the day, between 10 and 
11am… The unfortunate thing is they did not give us a receipt to show what they have 
confiscated … I believe in a normal situation they issue a receipt … We did not get any 
chance to talk to them regarding how we could go about [getting back] the goods 
seized.”
170
 
In effect, Operation Fiela was a heavy-handed and high-profile effort on the part of government to 
reassure South Africans that it was doing something about the ‘problem’ of migration from other 
countries. There is no evidence on how many Zimbabweans, or Zimbabwean entrepreneurs, 
were affected by this ‘show of strength’ but many probably were. The People’s Coalition Against 
Xenophobia, a grouping of civil-society organisations, repeatedly criticised Operation Fiela as a 
‘show of institutional xenophobia’.  
 
With regard, specifically, to the violence against foreign-owned businesses, government has been 
extremely responsive to arguments that these businesses are providing ‘unfair’ competition and 
putting South Africans out of business. Whether this is actually true or not has never been 
ascertained and research evidence about the positive economic impacts of migrant and refugee 
business activity is strategically ignored. The Department of Trade and Industry developed and 
published a National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (or NIBUS) in 2013.
171
 The Strategy 
includes a section on the “influx of foreigners into the informal business sector and ensuing 
conflict with locals”.
172
 According to NIBUS, foreign-owned informal businesses are an “express 
challenge” since there is “no regulatory restrictions in controlling the influx of foreigners (sic)” and 
“no synergy between the DRI and Home Affairs in devising strategies and policies to control 
foreign business activities.
173
 The Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, Elizabeth Thabete, 
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sharply criticised South Africans for renting their properties to migrants by referring to “the 
scourge of South Africans in townships selling and renting their businesses to foreigners 
unfortunately does not assist us as government in our efforts to support and grow these informal 
businesses”.
174
 
   
In 2014, a Department of Small Business Development was created to identify a strategy to 
manage the informal sector and encourage small, medium and micro enterprise (SMME) 
development. The Minister, Lindiwe Zulu, initially acknowledged the right of international migrants 
to operate saying “They must make a living. The more they make a living, the more they 
contribute to the economy. They pay taxes and are active participants in the economy”.
175
 But by 
2015 she was arguing that “foreign business owners in SA’s townships cannot expect to co-exist 
peacefully with local business owners unless they share their trade secrets”, and that “foreigners” 
cannot “barricade themselves in and not share their practices with local business owners”.
176
 
Statements similarly critical of migrant entrepreneurs were made by the Co-Chair of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Home Affairs investigating the xenophobic attacks in early 2015. 
The Chair essentially blamed the victims for the attacks: "they roam, they go to townships to 
occupy the economic space. We never invaded economic space in exile".
177
 The IMC briefed the 
Committee and referred to the “business models used by migrants to discourage competition 
such as forming monopolies, evading taxes, avoiding customs and selling illegal and expired 
goods”.
178
 
 
The “criminalisation” of migrant-owned informal business reached its nadir with the tabling of the 
Licensing of Businesses Bill in Parliament by the DTI in 2013.
179
 The Bill specified that any 
person involved in business activities would be required to have a licence to operate and that 
licences would only be given to non-citizens who had acquired a refugee permit or a business 
permit. According to the Immigration Act, business permits had to be applied for in the country of 
origin and are only granted if the individual has ZAR 2,5 million (1,7 million EUR) to invest in 
South Africa, effectively precluding any non-refugee migrants from operating in the informal 
economy. Further, enforcement of the bill was delegated to the police and community 
organisations, effectively encouraging South Africans to identify and help ‘root out’ foreign 
owners. Defending the bill, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Robert Davies, claimed that the bill 
was designed to stop illegal goods entering and being sold in the country. After a chorus of 
protest, including from big business, the bill was withdrawn for redrafting in 2014. A new bill has 
still not appeared and it is not clear if there will be one.  
 
The national government has also supported provincial level efforts to curb informal migrant 
entrepreneurship. In 2013, the Limpopo police launched Operation Hard Stick and closed over 
600 informal businesses, detained the owners, confiscated their stock, imposed arbitrary fines for 
trading without permits. The operation was successfully challenged by migrant associations and 
human rights NGOs in the courts. The Limpopo Department of Economic Development was 
supported in the Supreme Court by several national government departments in the case of 
Somali Association of South Africa and Others, Environment and Tourism and Others. The 
Associations’ affidavit claimed that the police actions “tell a story of the most naked form of 
xenophobic discrimination and of the utter desperation experienced by the victims of that 
discrimination”.
180
 The Supreme Court judgment observed that “one is left with the uneasy feeling 
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that the stance adopted by the authorities in relation to the licensing of spaza shops and tuck-
shops was in order to induce foreign nationals who were destitute to leave our shores”.
181
  
 
Other provincial governments have been equally unwelcoming. Most extreme has been North-
West Province where the premier, Supra Mahumapelo, announced in March 2016 that he wanted 
all informal shops (spazas/tuck shops) in the province to be owned and operated by South 
Africans only.
182
 Speaking at the official opening of the provincial house of traditional leadership 
he observed:  
 
“You would realise that the tuck shops for instance have been leased to foreign nationals, 
so one of the things we want to attack, working with the traditional leaders is that people 
must get back their shops.”
183
  
 
He proposed an investment of ZAR 200 million (13 million EUR) to establish and stock massive 
warehouses in all four of the province's districts to assist South African business owners to 
acquire stock. Similarly, in Gauteng, the MEC (Member of the Executive Council) for economic 
development, Lebogang Maile, has reportedly embarked on a campaign to empower and help 
sustain South African small businesses, suggesting that his department was bringing in large 
private sector companies to forge partnerships with small business owners. The initiative was 
reportedly “a direct response to a known business plan used by foreign traders, who club together 
to buy their stock items in bulk for guaranteed discounts”.
184
   
In terms of the development of a broader national plan or strategy to address xenophobia and 
xenophobic violence, there has been little progress. As long ago as 2001, at the Third World 
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in 
Durban, the South African government committed itself to developing a National Action Plan to 
Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. This commitment 
was not honoured until well after May 2008 and became the responsibility of the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development. Successive drafts of the Draft Action Plan were 
formulated and sent back by Cabinet. By the end of the process, the Justice Department 
proposed to drop all references to xenophobia in the Action Plan. This proposal was resolutely 
opposed by the non-governmental representatives on the responsible committee. The draft was 
finally released for public comment in October 2015. It provides few concrete and no 
comprehensive recommendations for dealing with xenophobic violence other than mentioning 
various initiatives embarked on in 2015 and proposing better monitoring of borders and 
immigration policy.
185
  
 
Following a series of public consultations, the South African government released a Green Paper 
on International Migration in June 2016, proposing a major overhaul of the South African 
immigration and refugee system.
186
 The Green Paper is an uneasy amalgam of control-oriented 
recommendations (particularly proposals for restricting the rights of asylum-seekers) and 
development-oriented recommendations (such as proposals for facilitating access to foreign skills 
and a permit system for SADC nationals to work and run businesses in South Africa). On the 
issue of xenophobia and xenophobic violence, the Green Paper is virtually silent.  
 
The more general obstacle to the development of a national strategy on xenophobia has been the 
consistent and very public refusal of government to admit that xenophobia even exists in South 
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Africa and to detach xenophobic violence from prejudice, discrimination and intolerance.
187
 In 
2004, the Minister of Home Affairs had commented in Parliament: 
 
“For us the scourge of xenophobia needs to be condemned, because it is based on 
prejudice, is frequently violent, and most of the time, racist. There is no way that as the 
South African government and as a nation we can tolerate or justify xenophobia.”
188
 
 
In the aftermath of May 2008, however, a new narrative emerged from government. The first 
public statement of what has since hardened into the official position came when President Mbeki 
publicly declared in a memorial service for the victims that xenophobia did not exist in South 
Africa. After 2008, there was a marked tendency by South African politicians from the ruling party 
to avoid the term xenophobia when referring to violence against migrants. This position had been, 
and continues to be, reinforced on a regular basis by ministers and government spokespersons 
each time anti-migrant and -refugee violence breaks out. In the wake of the violence of 2015, the 
same argument was made.  
 
Human Rights Watch has criticised the government of South Africa for failing to accept that “the 
violence against the foreign nationals has been motivated by xenophobia” and describing it 
instead as “pure acts of criminality”.
189
 A statement released by two prominent South African civil 
society organisations contended that “for too long, South Africans in leadership positions have 
either ignored the crisis [of xenophobia] or stoked the fires of hatred”.
190
 The evidence for ongoing 
xenophobia denialism is overwhelming.
191
 In 2015, President Zuma, for example, publicly 
declared:  
 
“We reiterate our view that South Africans are generally not xenophobic. If they were, we 
would not have such a high number of foreign nationals who have been successfully 
integrated into communities all over our country, in towns, cities and villages.”
192
 
 
At the African Union meeting in Johannesburg in June 2015, Zuma reiterated the government’s 
position by arguing that “South Africans are not xenophobic. We do not believe that the actions of 
a few out of more than 50 million citizens justify the label of xenophobia”.
193
 He went on to urge 
the forum to collectively tackle the “challenge of migration, whether in SADC or in the North.” At 
other regional platforms, too, he again focused on the supposedly abnormal, exceptional 
character of migration to South Africa, focusing on the threat it poses to its citizens. At one point, 
to justify this position, officials claimed that South Africa had over one million asylum-seekers, 
more than any other country in the world. This was clearly erroneous and was later corrected 
when the DHA clarified that their number did not refer to those currently awaiting a hearing bur 
rather to the total number of people who had applied for asylum since the introduction of the 1998 
Refugees Act. Less than 100,000 were actually awaiting adjudication in 2016.
194
   
 
Defense Minister Mapisa-Nqakula’s statement at a briefing on managing xenophobic violence (in 
stark contrast to her stated position as Minister of Home Affairs in 2004) centred on migrant 
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‘illegality’ and their criminal activities: “While government is going to be taking resolute actions 
against South Africans who attack foreign nationals, we are equally determined to take action 
against all foreign nationals who commit crime in our country”.
195
 The ANC’s Secretary-General, 
Gwede Mantashe, openly blamed the rising numbers of migrants for the violence and the solution, 
as expected, was the “tightening [of] immigration laws” and “if need be, establish refugee camps” 
to geographically segregate migrants from citizens.
196
 As Davis has observed, “while the official 
discourse is disapproving of xenophobia – when it admits it exists – there are frequent hints that 
leaders privately share the concerns of aggrieved locals about the presence of foreigners in 
South Africa”.
197
 The threat perception attached to migrants is very high and in such a situation, 
migrants themselves are in constant danger of being blamed for the violent outbreaks. It was no 
surprise, therefore, when the Zimbabwean migrants interviewed for this study all asserted that the 
South African government was ‘doing nothing’ about xenophobic violence. 
 
7.4. Responses of South African Police to Xenophobia 
 
A 2010 SAMP survey of South African attitudes towards migrants asked whether certain basic 
rights, such as the right to police protection, should be extended to citizens, legal temporary 
migrant workers, refugees and undocumented migrants in the country.
198
 As many as 90% felt 
that police protection should ‘always’ be extended to South African citizens. However, only 54% 
said it should ‘always’ be extended to legal migrants, 36% to refugees and only 21% to irregular 
migrants. Fully half said that irregular migrants should ‘never’ enjoy police protection.   
 
There is a long history of serious police misconduct in their dealings with migrants in South 
Africa.
199
 Encouraged by their political and line bosses, the police tend to conflate crime-fighting 
and migration enforcement. Arrests of migrants are reported along with crime statistics such as 
murder, robbery and drug smuggling, just one sign of the criminalising of migration and migrants 
in the country. However, enforcement itself is inconsistent and haphazard in a context where 
bribery and corruption are commonplace. Demands for bribes from migrants and refugees are 
commonplace, especially when the proffered alternative is arrest, confinement at Lindela holding 
centre and summary deportation. According to one source, migrants are viewed by the police as 
“mobile ATMs”.
200
 Misconduct extends to confiscating or destroying documents, unlawful entry of 
premises, and use of ‘markers’ such as language proficiency, skin colour, pronunciation of words 
and vaccination marks to identify and arrest ‘foreigners’. These practices are well-known to 
migrants who develop a variety of strategies to avoid identification and arrest. 
 
Misconduct for material gain is compounded by overtly xenophobic behaviour. High profile 
incidents of malfeasance – including severe physical and verbal abuse – are penalised when 
caught on video and because of the resultant media outcry, but many routine misdemeanours go 
unpunished.
201
 All of this is well-known and documented. According to a number of the 
interviewees, particularly those selling on the streets, they experience almost continuous police 
harassment: 
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“They come at different times to disrupt our businesses. For instance, the metro (police) 
can come and park their car right in front of where I sell and for the next hour or two I will 
not be able to sell anything. Even if I decide to move to the other street, the metro will be 
patrolling in those areas as well. Moving to a new area is a risk because you do not know 
the place, the people who are there and how these metro people patrol. Some of them 
come with so much hostility and I cannot do anything about it. If they tell me to move 
away I have to move away and if they want to take my things I just let them.” 
(Johannesburg Interview No. 1) 
 
The same interviewee described how harassment for trading in certain places is compounded by 
threats, theft, demands for bribes and arbitrary confiscation of goods: 
  
“Sometimes the metro [municipal police] and [national] police can just come and take 
your products. During winter they came and took socks and hats worth ZAR 20 [1,38 
EUR]. Once you just try to confront them, they tell you that this is not your country, go 
back to your country. I don’t really have the power to argue with them so I just let them be. 
Tomorrow the same thing can happen again. The police officer will just come and say 
they lost the gloves and take another pair. If they are in the mood of arresting people, 
they will arrest you despite the fact that they took your things before. Some are those 
who arrest you ask for a certain amount of money like ZAR 200 [13,8 EUR]. Maybe that 
day you only made ZAR 50 [3,46 EUR]and if you try to explain that you don’t have the 
money, they threaten to take all your stock. It will be up to me now the check the value of 
the stock I am having at that moment in comparison to the ZAR 200 [13,8 EUR] they 
wants. If the stock value is more than ZAR 200 [13,8 EUR] and I don’t have it, I am forced 
to ask from other people. If they assist me, I give (to the police) and they go and if not, 
they take all my stock.” 
Many of the interviewees had similar stories of police harassment and misconduct. However, the 
main focus in this report is on how the police respond during episodes of xenophobic violence or 
in their aftermath: what kinds of protection do the police provide to migrants? And what happens 
when Zimbabwean migrant entrepreneurs report looting and other crimes against their persons 
and property to the police? 
 
On the first question, a recurring theme was police inaction during episodes of mass xenophobic 
violence. Some felt that the police were extremely slow to respond. As one respondent noted “the 
police usually come late when everything has been done and people have been killed or their 
goods stolen” (Cape Town Interview No. 5). Others commented on how the police offered no 
protection even when they were present: 
 
“Both the City of Cape Town and the Police are not protecting us at all. Like on the day 
that the people were demonstrating, the police were there. They were just walking. After 
they were passing, the people started taking our things. There was no one to protect us 
and no one to stop those people. So, I don’t know what they are doing. I think they just 
put on uniform and walk around. When there is trouble they don’t come to protect us.” 
(Cape Town Interview No. 4) 
 
“The police just stand at the robots. Or they run away. There is poor enforcement 
because their response is very slow. Containers were being opened and things taken 
while the police stared.  They are either scared of the people or because it’s their own 
people so they can’t stop them. There were three police vehicles, but they just stood 
while people’s containers were being opened. Only foreign containers were broken and 
they knew whose container it is. No containers for local Xhosas (South Africans) were 
broken into and destroyed.” (Cape Town Interview No. 12) 
 
One respondent felt that the reason for inaction was that “South Africans do not fear police” and 
compared the police behaviour with that in Zimbabwe: 
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“They throw stones at the police. Have you ever seen people throwing stones at the 
police in Zimbabwe? No, they do not do that. Here they just do what they want. So they 
attack foreigners even if the police are there. Unless the police are using teargas or 
throwing water. But they rarely do that. But you can run to a police station if you are close 
and seek refuge. There are other areas where the local people even attacked police 
stations – attacked foreigners in police stations.” (Cape Town Interview No. 7) 
 
On the second question, there was a pervasive view that there was little point reporting theft or 
assault to the police because nothing was ever done, based on past experiences of police 
inaction. Cases might be opened but the perpetrators were rarely arrested and brought to book 
and stolen goods were rarely, if ever, recovered: 
 
“It was the mob that took the things and what would I tell the police? Besides there were 
many people whose goods were destroyed that I never bothered.  The police do not help 
much. It is useless to report to the police. The police here do not care. Especially if you 
are a foreigner. They will just tell you it is a mob. They cannot arrest a mob.” 
(Johannesburg Interview No. 2) 
 
The argument that the police were not particularly concerned by what happened to ‘foreigners’ 
was very common:  
 
“We just see the police, but they come too late and do not do anything. They do not 
arrest anyone even though you report. They are just moving about, but really doing 
nothing. I sometimes think that even the police hate us the foreigners. Would they do the 
same and not help if foreigners attack local people? No, they would arrest us. So the 
police do not help us and would rather see us gone.” (Johannesburg Interview No. 10) 
 
One claimed that even if someone was arrested, “as soon as they have gone around the corner 
they will ask or a bribe and release the person. As soon as the person is released they will either 
come and shoot you or permanently injure you” (Johannesburg Interview No. 18). The police are 
certainly held in very low esteem by Zimbabwean migrants. Another said that they had reported a 
robbery to the police and even named the perpetrators but little was done to assist them:  
 
“They took down my details and the details of the things I lost. I listed all of them and 
went with them to the police station. I was told that they would call me when they have 
made progress and that was that. I went back but there was no progress. The officer who 
was dealing with the issue kept telling me there were no suspects and that there was 
nothing they could do. I even gave them some names of the suspects because I had 
seen some of them, but the police officer did not even take them down. He insisted that 
there needed to be a witness for him to put those people as witnesses. I thought he 
should have at least questioned them or gone to their homes and searched. Neither was 
done.” (Polokwane Interview No. 4) 
 
Apart from the failure to protect, in a xenophobic environment in which migrants are extremely 
vulnerable, there is always the possibility that the police themselves might seek to take 
advantage of the situation for their own personal gain. This was certainly the view of many of the 
interviewees who described persistent police harassment, and even theft, during business hours. 
Confiscation of stock appears to be relatively common and the owners are forced to pay large 
fines to retrieve their goods. In many cases, the fines are so large that they simply abandon the 
goods, borrow money and begin again. Simply to be allowed to operate in an area for a day or to 
avoid impounding of goods may require payment of a bribe of up to ZAR 200 (13,8 EUR). Mobile 
vendors play a continuous cat and mouse game with the police, ready to pack up their goods and 
disappear at the first sign of a police car.  
 
In sum, police protection cannot be counted on during episodes of mob violence and there is also 
very little redress when individuals report crimes against their businesses or themselves to the 
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police. Fear of reprisals from those whom they report or identify is also a very real disincentive to 
getting the police involved. As a result, there is a certain fatalism and resignation to the 
inevitability of losing goods and property in general or isolated attacks. The interviews with the 
migrant business-owners clearly indicate that police protection is completely inadequate or non-
existent when xenophobic violence occurs.  
 
7.5. Responses of Other South African Stakeholders 
 
There is a massive gulf between the views of the South African government and human rights 
and civil society organisations, on the other, on the causes and remedies for xenophobic violence. 
One (the government) argues that xenophobia does not exist; the other (civil society) argues that 
it is a fundamental problem which has still not been adequately addressed.  
 
7.5.1. NGO Views Concerning Xenophobic Violence  
 
The views of civil society and human rights organisations about xenophobia include the following 
representative statements: 
 
 The failure of South Africa to finalise a National Action Plan (NAP) to Combat Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerances (first promised in 2001) 
“contributed to denial and lack of action to combat xenophobia, particularly since the 
outbreak of violence in 2008” (Consortium for Migrants and Refugees South Africa 
(CoRMSA)).
202
 
 The low rate of convictions and prosecutions for acts of violence against foreign nationals 
and other hate crimes sends the message that there is impunity for such criminal 
behaviour and is a contributing factor for on-going violence (CoRMSA). 
 There is a correlation between xenophobic sentiment, sexual violence and the impact it 
has on the lives of foreign women in South Africa, leaving foreign women vulnerable with 
little or no intervention from significant role players (Legal Resources Centre).  
 Xenophobia is a permanent presence in South Africa and there is a need to maintain 
vigilance against xenophobia and, in particular, against any resurgence in violence 
against foreign nationals (People’s Coalition Against Xenophobia).  
 Much of the resurgence of violence against foreign nationals in South Africa is due in part 
to the failure, from within and outside of government to learn lessons from the attacks 
which took place in May 2008. Since those attacks, there have been consistent and 
continued attacks against foreign nationals, particularly shop-owners in our communities. 
Reports and research conducted after the 2008 attacks, including by the Parliamentary 
Task Force set up in 2008 and the South African Human Rights Commission, were not 
taken forward in a meaningful way in order to combat the scourge of violence against 
foreign nationals (People’s Coalition).  
 Public hearings should be held regarding past and future violence against foreign 
nationals in order to create a national plan of action to end such violence and to address 
the existence (and exploitation) of xenophobia in South African society resulting in 
attacks which are used as part of attempts to remove foreign nationals from communities. 
An independent process should take place through a process similar to that of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (People’s Coalition).  
 There remains a tendency within South African society as a whole, and within some 
sectors of government in particular, to deny the existence of xenophobia and to reduce 
attacks on foreign nationals to mere acts of criminality no different to any other such 
criminal attacks against South Africans. Those who believe that xenophobia exists have 
been publically accused of being mischievous and unpatriotic. The Coalition argued that 
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denying xenophobia is very dangerous as it robs the country of the opportunity of finding 
solutions to a very real problem (People’s Coalition).  
 A national dialogue should be created, perhaps through the same programme, to 
promote a type of social cohesion which includes all members of the community, 
including foreign nationals, breaks down misperceptions of foreign nationals, and 
discourages xenophobic sentiments and statements as counter-productive to nation-
building (People’s Coalition).  
 There is incitement to violence by persons in positions of authority. There is no 
information on how authority figures who have made comments which led to violence and 
played a role in perpetuating xenophobia and intolerance in the country have been dealt 
with (Southern African Litigation Centre).  
 The South African government and the SAHRC should immediately take steps to 
implement the recommendations in the SAHRC report on the 2008 xenophobic violence 
(Southern African Litigation Centre).  
 Discrimination against foreign nationals by state officials in various sectors such as health 
care, or public education, informs, shapes and perpetuates public sentiment. This 
discrimination is reinforced by state officials who make public comments referring to 
asylum seekers as illegitimate, equating foreign nationals with criminals, and referring to 
foreign nationals as unworthy recipients of state resources (Scalabrini Centre).  
 
Prominent human rights groups were extremely critical of the governmental response to 
xenophobic violence in 2015 and, in particular, Operation Fiela which was viewed as an 
incitement to xenophobia, if not xenophobic in itself: 
 
 MSF described it as a “festering contradiction”, sending conflicting messages to migrants 
who remained vulnerable and deeply traumatised, just as it undermined the much-
required emphasis on “reconciliation, dialogue and reintegration to the general public”;
203
 
 LHR characterised Operation Fiela as “state-sponsored xenophobia” and “institutional 
xenophobia” which blurred stark differences between “criminals’ and migrants, while 
deepening the divide between citizens and foreigners by bolstering negative perceptions, 
instead of correcting them”.
204
  
 Amnesty International said that the IMC was supposed to deal with the underlying causes 
of tension “but instead they unleashed Operation Fiela and gave us statistics on how 
many foreign nationals were arrested and how many criminals were arrested. A lot of 
human rights violations were committed.” Because of Operation Fiela, the IMC “was not a 
success” (Interview with Amnesty International).  
 The People’s Coalition Against Xenophobia noted that Operation Fiela was supposedly 
both an anti-crime campaign and an attempt to combat xenophobia, but that “most of 
these operations are happening in areas with a large number of foreign nationals and 
most arrests are of undocumented migrants. The result is that an impression is being 
created that all crime is being carried out by undocumented foreign nationals.” As a result 
“far from combating xenophobia, these actions are feeding the xenophobic tendencies of 
those South Africans who share the belief that all of our problems are caused by 
migrants”.
205
 
 CoRMSA described Operation Fiela as a “ridiculous response to xenophobia and 
encouragement of the notion that foreigners are the problem and we can blame them – 
which deflects from the real problem. Further, “taking it out on foreign nationals in 
Operation Fiela gives the message that if we attack them then the government will take 
them out – they are illegal and doing illegal activities – they’re seen as criminals” 
(Interview with CoRMSA).  
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Subsequent sections examine the responses of the major institutional non-governmental 
stakeholders. 
 
7.5.2. South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) 
  
The SAHRC, an independent but government-funded body, has had a longstanding interest in the 
problem of xenophobia in South Africa and has made various interventions over the years 
including: 
 
 In 1998, the SAHRC released its Braamfontein Statement on Xenophobia which 
condemned xenophobia as a violation of human rights; 
 In 1999, the SAHRC released an investigative report on rights abuse in the arrest and 
detention of migrants (SAHRC, 1999);
206
 
 In 1999, the SAHRC launched a ‘Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign: National Plan of 
Action’ which was based on the fact that “South Africa needs to send out a strong 
message that an irrational prejudice and hostility towards non-nationals is not acceptable 
under any circumstances”.
207
 The Plan focused on six areas: the plight and rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers; violence against foreign hawkers; violations of the rights of 
migrant workers; the role of education; the conduct of police officers and civil servants; 
and media coverage of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. The Plan became 
defunct in 2004 due to funding constraints. 
 In 2002, SAHRC made written inputs into government policy development around the 
2002 Immigration Act. In the view of the SAHRC, the Act promoted and institutionalised 
xenophobia and racism. 
 In 2004, the SAHRC conducted ‘Open Hearings on Xenophobia and Problems Related to 
It’ in partnership with the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs. SAHRC 
concluded that it “had made a number of recommendations prior to 2008 that, if fully 
implemented, might have mitigated the May crisis”.
208
 
 In 2010, the SAHRC released the results of its investigation into the 2008 xenophobic 
violence: ‘Report on the SAHRC Investigation into Issues of Rule of Law, Justice and 
Impunity arising out of the 2008 Public Violence against Non-Nationals’.
209
 This damning 
report made 20 major findings highly critical of all branches and levels of government and 
over 100 concrete and wide-ranging recommendations for action by different government 
departments including the Departments of Cooperative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs, Education, Home Affairs, Human Settlements, Justice and Constitutional 
Development, Social Development and local and provincial developments as well as the 
South African Police Services, the South African National Defence Force and the SAHRC 
itself.
210
 A review of the recommendations shows that none specifically address 
xenophobic violence against migrant-owned businesses. 
 In 2014, the SAHRC investigated conditions under which deportees were being held at 
Lindela Reception Centre, following a complaint from MSF, Section27, Lawyers for 
Human Rights and People Against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty (PASSOP) against 
three government departments, the South African Police Service and a private company, 
Bosasa.
211
  
 In 2015, the SAHRC investigated the complaint of the African Diaspora Forum and 30 
others about reportedly xenophobic statements attributed to the Zulu King Zwelithini.
212
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In sum, since the end of apartheid, the SAHRC has consistently advocated for change in the way 
in which the South African government responds to xenophobia but has not specifically made any 
recommendations about the causes of and remedies for xenophobic attacks against migrant-
owned small businesses. The general consensus seems to be that very few of the SAHRC’s 
extensive list of recommendations to government arising from the May 2008 violence have been 
implemented. There has certainly been no systematic evaluation of how government has 
responded, although the Minister of Home Affairs claimed in Parliament in May 2015 that his 
Department had implemented most of the SAHRC’s 19 recommendations.
213
 
7.5.3. Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) 
CoRMSA is an advocacy consortium of South African NGOs and CSOs which has been a 
consistent critic of government inaction on xenophobia for a number of years. Amongst its anti-
xenophobia activities have been the following: 
 In 2008, in the aftermath of May 2008, CoRMSA, released a ‘Report on Protecting 
Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Migrants in South Africa’. The report provided evidence 
of “a long history of violence against non-nationals in South Africa without effective steps 
being taken by various government departments to address this conflict.” The report 
made general recommendations for dealing with xenophobia and the Zimbabwean 
migration crisis.
214
   
 In 2010, CoRMSA successfully launched a case against South African banks, seeking to 
overturn the Financial Intelligence Centre’s (FIC’s) decision to advise banks against 
opening accounts for asylum seekers and refugees or allowing them to transact on their 
already existing accounts. The case (CoRMSA vs Absa and others) was successful. The 
court ordered the banks to allow asylum seekers and refugees to open bank accounts. 
 In 2011, CoRMSA’s updated report commented that “South Africa’s inability to come to 
terms with Zimbabwean migration continues to tarnish the country’s reputation and 
reveals more fundamental questions about the commitment to protect non‐nationals 
within its borders. While marketed as a generous offer to help Zimbabweans secure legal 
status in South Africa, (the) ‘regularisation’ process was characterised by bureaucratic 
ineptitude and dissimulation.” It notes that there have been ongoing attacks on 
‘foreigners’ and looting of foreign-owned shops and expresses concern that “not enough 
is being done at a local and national level to deal with cases that are attributed to mere 
‘criminality’”. Further, that “while there have examples of swift and decisive response, 
security responses have generally been late and reactive despite clear warning signs. 
Where violence has occurred, we continue to see impunity, lack of accountability and 
little effort to address the community leadership and local governance issues raised as 
direct causes of the violence.” The report made a wide range of recommendations to 
government departments including for categories of migrants such as labour migrants, 
child migrants and migrant sex workers but not migrant-owned businesses, and does not 
provide recommendations in that regard.
215
  
 
7.5.4. Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) – South Africa  
 
LHR have had a longstanding interest in migration and xenophobia in South Africa, dating back to 
the 1990s. Its Refugee and Migrant Rights Programme (RMRP) is a “specialist programme that 
advocates, strengthens and enforces the rights of asylum-seekers, refugees and other 
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marginalised categories of migrants in South Africa”.
216
 Over the years, LHR has made a large 
number of submissions to government departments, commissions of enquiry and parliamentary 
committees. It is a member of CoRMSA and also has a Strategic Litigation Unit. LHR’s successes 
in the courts have helped roll back some government policies and had a material impact on the 
operating environment for migrant-owned businesses. The history of LHR and non-LHR litigation 
suggests that greater use could be made of the courts. Previous cases of relevance to this report 
include the following:
217
 
 
 2002: Muriel Watchenuka and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others. High Court 
(Western Cape) declared the prohibition on asylum-seekers working was unconstitutional 
(non-LHR).  
 2003: Minister of Home Affairs v Muriel Watchenuka and Cape Town Refugee Centre. 
The Watchenuka judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 2004: Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs. The Court rejected the 
state’s argument that persons illegally in the country had no rights and were protected 
only by international law.  
 2011: Zimbabwe Exiles Forum and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others. The 
Court ruled against the state in the unlawful arrest and detention of Zimbabweans during 
a protest in Pretoria.  
 2014: South African Informal Traders Forum and Others v City of Johannesburg and 
Others; South African National Traders Retail Association v City of Johannesburg and 
Others. The court ruled against the City of Johannesburg’s Operation Cleansweep (non-
LHR case). 
 2014: Somali Association of South Africa and Others v Limpopo Department of Economic 
Development Environment and Tourism and Others. The Supreme Court against the 
state on the discriminatory targeting of foreign traders in Limpopo by police and the 
Department of Home Affairs. 
 2016: Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs and Others. The High Court 
(Gauteng Division) found two sections of the Immigration Act of 2002 governing aspects 
of detention and deportation unconstitutional. 
 
7.5.5. People’s Coalition Against Xenophobia (PCAX)  
 
The People’s Coalition was formed in response to the 2015 violence and comprises 11 South 
African civil society organisations including Awethu, SECTION27, CoRMSA, Lawyers for Human 
Rights, MSF, Corruption Watch, the African Diaspora Forum (ADF), the Nine Plus Unions and the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC). The PCAX has organised anti-xenophobia protest marches 
and in June 2016 launched a campaign against proposed amendments to the Refugees Act 
which would confront asylum-seekers with deportation if they fail to apply for refugee status within 
five days of entering the country and limit or prohibit them from working.  
 
7.5.6. Other South African CSOs 
 
A wide range of local non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations and faith-
based groups have been exercised by the crisis of xenophobia and have mobilised on a 
significant scale to offer humanitarian assistance to those victimised by xenophobic violence, 
especially in 2008 and 2015. Frustrated by their inability to get the South African government to 
acknowledge the reality of xenophobia and to implement effective prevention strategies, civil 
society organisations have combined to appeal to regional bodies to pressure the South African 
government to act. An open letter to the African Commission African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights (ACHPR) on 23 April 2015 urged it to “call upon the South African government to 
take concrete steps to end (the) attacks, prosecute perpetrators and protect migrants and 
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refugees living in their territory from violations of their human rights”.
218
 The letter was signed by 
129 civil society organisations from across the continent.  
 
A notable development in the last few years has been the emergence of migrant associations and 
traders associations to give voice to and advocate for the interests and rights of migrants and 
refugees. The Somali and Ethiopian refugee communities in South Africa are particularly notable 
for their organisation and activism. An African Diaspora Forum engages in various educational 
and social cohesion activities and advocates for the rights of migrants and refugees in South 
Africa.
219
  
 
Zimbabwe Exiles Forum is particularly active in Zimbabwe opposition politics in exile but also 
seeks to protect the rights of Zimbabweans in South Africa.
220
 However, most of the interviewees 
in the interviews for this project were not members of any association and several commented 
that that was not something that Zimbabweans were interested in.  
 
The role and impact of civil society has prompted a debate in the literature. Robins shows how 
key civil society organisations reached well beyond their institutional mandates to mobilise 
against xenophobia in 2008 and become involved in offering assistance to its victims.
221
 Everatt, 
too, points to the rapid mobilisation of civil society as something not seen in South Africa since 
the end of apartheid but concludes that the momentum quickly waned.
222
 But he also criticises 
Landau and other contributors to Hassim et al. for supposedly decrying civil society mobilisation 
against xenophobia as a form of middle-class angst.
223
  
 
Misago et al. argue that a fundamental weakness of civil society efforts to reduce xenophobic 
violence has been a tendency to focus “almost exclusively on combatting anti-immigrant attitudes 
rather than addressing the local and national structures, processes and politics in which practices 
of exclusion are deeply embedded”.
224
 As a result, few CSOs can demonstrate “durable or broad-
based impact.” Pugh takes a more nuanced approach and does not write off all civil society 
interventions as focused solely on changing attitudes.
225
 However, she argues that the space for 
civil society organisations to have a policy impact has been, and continues to be, slight as they 
operate in the “constricted space” created by a national climate of anti-foreigner attitudes. As she 
argues, “the works of both state and civil society actors alike are impacted by the negative social 
constructions of migrant, refugee, and asylum seeker populations, which position migrants as 
both a burden and unwanted competition to the rights and well-being of South African citizens. 
While rights-based advocacy is a common approach for both CSOs and sympathetic policy- and 
decision-makers, the social and political realities of South Africa continue to inform a de facto 
hierarchy of rights, in which the issues and needs of South African citizens are, in practice, 
positioned above those of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers”.
226
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7.6. Responses of International Stakeholders  
 
7.6.1. UNHCR  
 
The UNHCR’s response to xenophobia in South Africa is guided by the organisation’s 2009 
‘South African Plan of Action and Status Report’. The UNHCR’s current anti-xenophobia 
programming was the subject of an independent evaluation commissioned by the UNHCR 
itself.
227
 The report noted that “combatting xenophobia, particularly preventing violent attacks, 
does not naturally fall into UNHCR’s traditional protection mandate”.
228
 While the evaluation 
praised UNHCR’s “tremendous efforts” at addressing xenophobia by supporting programmes and 
activities to protect refugees, these strategies, partnerships and supported programmes have not 
provided “effective and sustainable protection”.
229
   
 
Beyond its own specific programming, UNHCR established a ‘xenophobia emergency hotline’ 
through a partnership with the South African Police Services (SAPS) and chairs a Protection 
Working Group (PWG) which meets regularly and brings together UN agencies, international and 
local NGOs, faith based organisations, trade unions, government and police representatives and 
donors. The Group deals with all protection issues, including xenophobia.  
 
The evaluation notes that the PWG has been useful in making new partnerships but that it “does 
not seem to have resulted in the coordination of various anti-xenophobia programmes among 
group members or even among UNHCR implementing partners”.
230
 The report concludes with 15 
recommendations for UNHCR including developing an operational strategy, engaging the South 
African government in that strategy, creating advocacy networks, redesigning the role and 
functions of the PWG, creating an evidence base and capacity-building. Unfortunately, none of 
the recommendations specifically refer to how UNHCR might intervene in growing xenophobic 
violence against informal enterprises.  
 
UNHCR partners with several NGOs to provide livelihood (including small business support) in 
several centres including in Cape Town where it funds the Cape Town Refugee Centre’s (CTRC) 
Self-Reliance Programme to improve skilled refugees' access to formal employment through the 
evaluation of qualifications, advocate for refugees’ right to work and operate informal businesses, 
and provide business skills training and start-up grants of ZAR 4,000–10,000 (276 – 692 EUR) to 
refugees and asylum seekers to open micro and small businesses. Similar support programmes 
exist with NGOs in Port Elizabeth, Durban and Musina.  
 
UNHCR is moving away from grants towards a system of loans and issuing start-up kits despite 
the success of these support programmes. Most of those assisted are Somalis or Congolese. 
Since so few Zimbabweans have refugee status, they are generally not eligible for support and 
none of the Zimbabwean interviewees on this project had received assistance or, indeed, had any 
contact at all with the UNHCR.  
 
7.6.2. International Organization for Migration (IOM) – South Africa 
 
The IOM has operated in South Africa since the mid-1990s and has mounted a series of 
migration-related programmes with implications for Zimbabwean migration to South Africa and 
the crisis of xenophobia over the years. The establishment of a Migrant Reception Centre at the 
South Africa–Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge in 2006 to provide advice and support to 
Zimbabweans deported from South Africa caused considerable controversy. The IOM was 
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criticised by Human Rights Watch for complicity in mass deportations.
231
 In 2016, the 
controversial reception centre was handed over to the Zimbabwean Departments of Social 
Services and Child Welfare. Other recent IOM interventions include the following: 
 
 In late 2009, the IOM launched a ‘One Movement’ anti-xenophobia campaign under the 
patronage of Desmond Tutu, to use “media campaigns, community conversations, youth 
mobilisation, curriculum interventions and human rights training with a wide range of civil 
society partners to promote a culture of tolerance, human dignity and unity in diversity 
across Southern Africa”.
232
 No evaluation of the activities or achievements of this 
campaign is available although the initiative no longer exists. 
 In 2012 IOM, in partnership with UNHCR and the City of Johannesburg, launched an ‘I 
Am A Migrant Too’ campaign “aimed at sensitising the South African public to the fact 
that migrants are an integral part of South African society”.
233
 Among its products were a 
song, a comic book and book of poetry.  
 In November 2016, IOM announced a partnership with the Mkhaya Migrants Awards 
Program of the Department of Home Affairs in an essay-writing competition on the topic 
‘Migrants’ Contribution to Our Communities, Country and Continent’. The prize for the ten 
winners includes an expenses-paid trip to the African Union headquarters in Addis 
Ababa. 
 In an interview for this project (Annex B), a representative from IOM’s mission to South 
Africa noted that IOM’s current strategy has three parts. First, IOM assists in the 
voluntary return of migrants. It avoided participation in “facilitated return” (such as the 
provision of buses to take Zimbabweans back to Zimbabwe) because the approach is 
“largely misguided” and “not sustainable”. Instead, IOM has advocated with the South 
African government for a policy of “assisted voluntary return and reintegration” (AVRR). 
At the same time, IOM recognises that “this is a policy which would be more productive, 
(but) it will be unpopular with South Africans.” 
 Second, IOM is concerned about the “pre-departure phase” including “sharing the 
realities of the process of migration.” Based on our interviews, traditional IOM campaigns 
focused on the risks and dangers of migration would be “ineffective and money wasted.” 
Instead, attention will focus on “letting people know that the perceptions they have of 
South Africa are mistaken – that it is very difficult to make a living and that you will be 
disappointed.” The methodology will be to rely on those who have been to South Africa 
as migrants to tell their stories of hardship.  
 In its third action area, IOM plans to focus on informal settlements in South Africa and 
“taking away the tension between host and migrants” through creating job opportunities, 
and improving access to health care, security and education. Exactly what this would 
entail is currently unspecified although IOM is proposing it as a “whole of UN approach” 
in partnership with other UN agencies. 
 IOM Zimbabwe has a range of programmes designed to assist the Zimbabwean 
government in migration management, anti-trafficking and policy development.
234
 An 
independent evaluation of IOM’s anti-xenophobia programmes, along the same lines as 
the UNHCR evaluation, would be extremely useful in determining whether or not they 
have had any impact.  
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7.6.3. International Labour Organization (ILO) 
The ILO has assumed an increasingly larger presence in Southern Africa over the last decade. It 
has been particularly active in tripartite projects, such as the South African Decent Work Country 
Programme, directed at documenting and improving the working conditions and rights of migrant 
workers in sectors such as mining, agriculture and domestic work. Since many Zimbabweans 
work in these three sectors, the ILO’s programmes do stand to benefit workers in those sectors. 
In terms specifically of interventions in the informal economy, the ILO more generally obviously 
has a longstanding interest in this area and the South African office has been involved in various 
initiatives.  These include the following: 
 ‘Private and Public Procurement and the Social Economy (PPPSE) Project’.235 A review 
of best practice interventions profiles six different community-based social enterprises but 
there is no mention of any participation by migrants. Similarly, a recent ILO scoping 
review of access to finance by social enterprises does not mention migrant-owned 
businesses and the particular difficulties they face.
236
  
 The ILO has recently co-hosted two National Informal Economy summits with local 
government and the national Department of Labour. The first, in November 2010, 
focused on ‘Managing the Informal Economy: A key service delivery function for Local 
Government’. The second, in June 2016, had the theme ‘Uplifting the Informal Economy 
and Creating Pathways to Formalisation’ which is consistent with the ILO’s general policy 
push on formalising the informal. As far as can be ascertained from the programmes and 
proceedings the role of migrants in the informal economy was ignored and xenophobic 
attacks not addressed either. A representative from ILO noted in an interview that one of 
the parallel sessions was a dialogue between migrant and national informal economy 
operators. 
 
7.6.4. Amnesty International – South Africa 
Amnesty International South Africa (AISA)’s work under its Discrimination and Equality 
Programme focuses on the protection and promotion of the human rights of marginalised groups 
and persons including asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants. AISA is firm in its position that 
“xenophobia is a constant threat facing many asylum seekers, refugees on a daily basis” 
(Interview with AISA). The Programme focuses on addressing violence and discrimination 
targeting these groups including the introduction of hate crimes legislation and lobbying for other 
protective policy and/or legislative frameworks. AISA also sat on the committee developing the 
National Action Plan on Racism and Xenophobia, and resisted attempts to drop xenophobia from 
the plan. 
7.6.5. European Union 
Information on European Union interventions comes from an interview with a member of the EU 
Delegation. The Delegation is working with refugee organisations as part of its human rights 
funding to build advocacy capacity and has supported the South African Human Rights 
Commission’s 20
th
 anniversary event. The EU is also involved in the development of the ‘National 
Action Plan on Racism and Xenophobia’. 
7.6.6. African Union 
The AU’s African Peer Review Mechanism Monitoring Project has consistently criticised South 
Africa over its handling of xenophobia. In its 2011 report, for example, the AU Project gave South 
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Africa a “red rating” for its failure to address, and its denial of, xenophobia.
237
 In 2015, the AU’s 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights adopted a resolution against the violence in 
South Africa.
238
 The Resolution requested that the South African government ensure that 
mechanisms were put in place to prevent xenophobia from reoccurring and urged South Africa to 
respect its obligations under the African Charter. Adeola makes the point that xenophobia is not 
unique to South Africa in the African context and argues that “the issue of xenophobia is a 
pressing challenge that cuts across human rights, governance, development and democracy in 
Africa. As it is not specific to one African state, an Africa-wide response is essential. Within this 
context, the role of the AU is primary”.
239
 He argues that seven institutions within the AU should 
develop a coordinated response to the issue of xenophobia in Africa. He does not suggest that 
the AU or any member governments should look to South Africa for “best practice” solutions for, 
indeed, it is hard to locate any.  
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8. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This case study of the double crisis of mass migration from Zimbabwe and xenophobia in South 
Africa has aimed to make a number of contributions to the literature on migration in countries in 
crisis.  First, it focuses on a crisis that is intrinsic to the migration process itself and, furthermore, 
only affects migrants; that is, the crisis of anti-migrant intolerance and xenophobic violence in 
South Africa. Xenophobia, by definition, is targeted at migrants and assumes crisis proportions 
when it manifests in extreme xenophobia; that is, both acute and chronic forms of violence 
against migrants. Migrants are the direct victims of this crisis and are forced to make a whole set 
of choices to mitigate, ameliorate or escape the tide of hostility and hatred that they are forced to 
confront on an almost daily basis. Extreme xenophobia in South Africa is increasingly manifesting 
itself in attacks on informal migrant entrepreneurs which raises the critical question of how 
xenophobia disrupts and destroys business activities and livelihoods, on the one hand, and what 
options and strategies are available to migrants under attack. However, anti-migrant intolerance 
and xenophobia is not confined to South Africa and, indeed, is spreading in both the global South 
and North. South Africa regrettably offers other jurisdictions a mirror of their own future if they fail 
to acknowledge the reality of xenophobia and counter its devastating effects.  
 
Second, the study focuses on a situation of double bind, that is, when the migrants leave a 
country in crisis and are then caught up in a crisis in the host country. One of the most common 
responses to crisis situations in a destination state is for migrants to return temporarily or 
permanently to their country of origin. The calculation of how to respond becomes a very different 
one when return is not necessarily a viable or sustainable option because of crisis conditions in 
the country of origin. The key question in relation to the crisis of extreme xenophobia in South 
Africa is whether return is actually a viable option for Zimbabweans. As this report clearly 
demonstrates, return is not a viable option for Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa because the 
alternative livelihood opportunities in Zimbabwe itself are virtually non-existent. At the same time, 
remittances to Zimbabwe from migrants are critical to the survival of those who remain. 
Xenophobic violence can cut off the flow of remittances and impact not only on those immediately 
affected but those who depend on a regular and stable transfer of cash and goods. 
 
Third, there is the question of whether there is any causal connection between increased 
migration flows to South Africa and extreme xenophobic violence. In other words, does an 
increase in migration to the country and a particular community heighten everyday xenophobia 
and set the stage for acts of extreme xenophobia? And since Zimbabweans are easily the largest 
group of migrants by nationality, are they more likely to be the victims of xenophobic violence 
than migrants from other countries with less visibility? Attitudinal surveys show that Zimbabweans 
are intensely disliked by the majority of South Africans and that this translates into a particular 
form of verbal loathing. The most noteworthy shift in the targets of xenophobic violence since 
2008 is migrants in general to migrants running businesses in the informal economy. Because 
increasing numbers of Zimbabweans work in the informal economy, they have, by definition, 
become more vulnerable to attack. Narratives of the migrants themselves collected for this project 
paint a desperate picture but also of resolve, determination and the drive to begin again when 
their businesses are reduced to ashes.  
 
Fourth, there is the issue of whether extreme xenophobia acts as a disincentive to further 
migration to South Africa. This certainly seems to be the belief in some official circles in South 
Africa. Friebel et al. provide some evidential support for this, arguing that xenophobic violence 
provides a dampening effect on migration from Mozambique which is mitigated by the strength of 
a potential migrant’s social networks in South Africa.
240
 There was no noticeable decline in 
migration from Zimbabwe after 2008 which seems to suggest that the xenophobic violence did 
not dissuade Zimbabweans from migrating to South Africa in the same way as in Mozambique. 
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The difference between Mozambique and Zimbabwe may be that in the former there are viable 
alternative livelihood strategies to migration, which simply do not exist in the latter.   
 
Fifth, since the primary focus of this research project is the crisis of xenophobia in South Africa, it 
is important to understand how the two governments (South African and Zimbabwean) have 
responded to xenophobia in general and the rash of extreme xenophobia in particular. From the 
perspective of the victims of xenophobic violence, it is clear that the overwhelming impression is 
that governments do nothing to help and do nothing to mitigate the problem. Particular criticism is 
reserved for the police and their failure to protect or punish. Police behaviour, as experienced by 
the migrants, simply makes them more vulnerable and is clearly motivated itself by xenophobic 
attitudes. Most evident, at a policy level, is the repeated denialism of the South African 
government at all levels. This position does a great deal more harm than good. If there is no 
xenophobia, there is no problem to address. The first step for any government wishing to rid a 
country of the plague of xenophobia is actually to admit that there is a serious disease.  
 
Sixth, there are other local and international stakeholders in South Africa who do recognise the 
reality of xenophobia and attempt to intervene or ameliorate the crisis. These include migrant 
associations, non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, faith-based 
organisations, international organisations with a strong local presence and the representatives of 
other governments and regional bodies. While these organisations are increasingly combining 
and working in concert, their impact on government policy is extremely constrained. On the 
contrary, they are more often working against government in the courts to protect the 
constitutional and other rights of migrants. Collaboration and cooperation is essential to achieve 
any progress but it is clear that most increasingly feel that the best approach is to work at the 
community-level in xenophobia hotspots. Many of these programmes are in their infancy and 
certainly none of the migrants interviewed in this project had any knowledge or contact with any 
of them. 
 
Finally, while the growing presence of Zimbabweans and other migrants in the informal economy 
may be disruptive to established South African business-owners, a persistent challenge here is 
that migration itself is treated as an aberrant process harmful to those who are at its receiving end, 
even if it is undertaken due to exceptional circumstances, as is the case for Zimbabweans. The 
urgent need to discuss and implement concrete ways to address xenophobia and also broader 
circumstances which precipitated the exodus of forced migrants from this country are shrunk 
down in a restrictive manner to limiting migrants’ entry and amplifying border controls. By doing 
so, a consistent, if troubling message is transmitted, that migrants contribute to xenophobic 
tendencies by their mere existence in receiving states like South Africa. Such a belief also 
undercuts the human rights of migrants and their right to be fully integrated into South African 
society.
241
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10. Annexes 
 
Annex A: Interviews with Zimbabwean Migrants  
 
 A. Johannesburg  
 
No. Date of Interview Place of 
Interview 
Gender Age Date Arrived 
in SA 
J1 14 Aug 2016 Central F 40 2014/2015 
J2 15 Aug 2016 Orange Farm M 46 2009 
J3 14 Aug 2016 Park Station M 35 2008 
J4 15 Aug 2016 Orange Farm M 39 2005 
J5 16 Aug 2016 Diepsloot M 25 2009 
J6 Incomplete     
J7 14 Aug 2016 Park Station F 41 2006 
J8 14 Aug 2016 Central F 52 2015 
J9 14 Aug 2016 Park Station F 42 2014 
J10 16 Aug 2016 Diepsloot F 38 2010 
J11 14 Aug 2016 Park Station M 33 2005 
J12 14 Aug 2016 Central F 45 2014 
J13 14 Aug 2016 Park Station M 37 2005 
J14 Incomplete     
J15 15 Aug 2016 Central M 33 2010 
J16 15 Aug 2016 Central F 23 2012 
J17 16 Aug 2016 Diepsloot M 40 2013 
J18 17 Aug 2016 Diepsloot M 22 2013 
J19 17 Aug 2016 Central 31 F 2009 
J20 19 Aug 2016 Orange Farm 47 F 2007 
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 B. Cape Town  
 
No. Date of Interview Place of 
Interview 
Gender Age Date Arrived 
in SA 
C1 07 Jul 2016 City Centre F 42 2011 
C2 08 Jul 2016 Philippi M 39 2005 
C3 09 Oct 2016 Masimphumelele M 29 2007 
C4 09 Jul 2016 City Centre F 42 2006 
C5 10 Jul 2016 City Centre M 40 2012 
C6 11 Jul 2016 Delft F 38 2005 
C7 12 Jul 2016 City Centre F 39 2007 
C8 07 Jul 2016 Du Noon F 26 2015 
C9 09 Oct 2016 Masimphumelele F 32 2010 
C10 09 Oct 2016 Masimphumelele M 42 2008 
C11 10 Oct 2016 City Centre F 39 2010 
C12 12 Oct 2016 Masimphumelele M 52 2006 
C13 Incomplete     
C14 12 Oct 2016 Masimphumelele F 28 2013 
C15 14 Oct 2016 Du Noon M 46 2004 
C16 14 Oct 2016 Du Noon M 48 2007 
C17 14 Oct 2016 Du Noon M 34 2003 
C18 14 Oct 2016 Du Noon M 48 2007 
C19 10 Jul 2016 City Centre F 48 2010 
C20 15 Oct 2016 Imizamo Yethu M 36 2005 
 
B. Polokwane  
 
No. Date of Interview Place of 
Interview 
Gender Age Date Arrived 
in SA 
P1 08 Aug 2016 Polokwane F 25 2012 
P2 09 Aug 2016 Polokwane M 44 1992 
P3 11 Sep 2016 Polokwane F 46 2005 
P4 12 Aug 2016 Polokwane M 48 2006 
P5 13 Aug 20106 Greenside M 39 2009 
P6 13 Aug 2016 Greenside M 33 2010 
P7 11 Aug 2016 Greenside M 39 2002 
P8 Incomplete     
P9 16 Aug 2016 Savannah M 40 2005 
P10 18 Aug 2016 CBD M 32 2012 
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Annex B: Key Informant Interviews 
 
Place of Interview Organisation 
Johannesburg Zimbabwe Exiles Forum  
Johannesburg 
 
Zimbabwe Exiles Forum  
Johannesburg City of Johannesburg  
Johannesburg Amnesty International  
Johannesburg Methodist Church  
Johannesburg Consortium for Refugees and Migrants South 
Africa  (CoRMSA) 
Johannesburg University of Johannesburg 
Pretoria Legal Resources Centre 
Pretoria Department of Home Affairs  
Pretoria Lawyers for Human Rights 
Pretoria UNHCR 
Pretoria IOM – South Africa 
Pretoria ILO 
Pretoria EU Delegation 
Cape Town Africa Unite 
Cape Town Scalabrini Institute 
Cape Town Department of Home Affairs 
Cape Town Médecins Sans Frontières 
Cape Town Western Province 
Cape Town Institute for Justice and Reconciliation  
Cape Town South African Informal Traders Association 
Cape Town African Centre for Cities 
 92 
Cape Town People Against Suffering, Oppression and 
Poverty  (PASSOP) 
Harare IOM – Zimbabwe 
Harare Union of Zimbabwe Journalists 
Harare Zimbabwe CBTA 
Limpopo South African Informal Traders Alliance 
Limpopo UNHCR 
Limpopo Somalian Association and Limpopo Refugee 
Forum 
Limpopo Zimbabwean Community 
 
summary of project
In 2015, the European Union (EU) launched ‘Migrants in Countries in Crisis: Supporting an Evidence-based 
Approach for Eﬀective and Cooperative State Action’, a four-year project implemented by the International 
Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). This EU-funded project is a contribution to the global 
Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) initiative, a government-led process co-chaired by the governments 
of the Philippines and the United States, which shares similar goals. The project aims to improve the 
capacity of states and other stakeholders to assist and provide protection to migrants who ﬁnd themselves 
in countries aﬀected by crisis, as well as address the long-term implications of such situations. Within the 
project, six regional consultations with states and other relevant stakeholders have been conducted, 
contributing to the development of the MICIC initiative ‘Guidelines to protect migrants in countries experi-
encing conﬂict or natural disaster’, which provide guidance for states and other stakeholders in responding 
to the needs of migrants caught in crisis situations. In addition, the project also develops capacity building 
activities to follow up on key recommendations that have emerged over the course of the project. This 
report presents one case study of the Research Component of the EU-funded MICIC project, whose goal is 
to complement these eﬀorts by providing policy-relevant analysis of the implications of crises for host, 
transit and origin countries.
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